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I. INTRODUCTION
A teenage boy returns from a night out with his friends to find his
home in disarray; furniture is strewn about and valuable belongings are
missing. He ventures towards his parents' bedroom, unaware of the hor-
rific scene that he soon will witness. As he enters his parents' bedroom
a sudden sense of reality washes over him as he views the scene in the
room: his parents are dead on their bed, in inhuman, violently con-
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torted positions, with blood covering the sheets, their bodies, the floor,
and the walls. The boy, in shock, reaches for the phone and calls the
police.
The authorities arrest the suspected murderer of the boy's parents,
put him in jail, appoint counsel, and apprise him of his legal rights. In
contrast, the boy is left to deal with his pain and anguish by seeking the
help of friends, extended family, and well-wishers. The boy's life is per-
manently altered. He is now an orphan, and the state will place him in
foster care. He will have to cope with the emotional trauma that accom-
panies the discovery of his parents' bodies and with the void that the
loss of both parents created.
The boy has no voice in pursuing the defendant's prosecution or in
agreeing to a plea bargain arrangement. When the case goes to trial, the
boy is left alone in the corridor so that his testimony will not be com-
promised by what he may have heard from other witnesses. The de-
fendant, however, is entitled to be present at all stages of the criminal
process. When the boy takes the stand, his testimony is brief; he tells
the jury what he saw in his parents' bedroom upon returning home that
evening, but he does not have the opportunity to tell the jury anything
else. The jury finds the defendant guilty, yet the boy is unsatisfied be-
cause the criminal justice system has not taken care of him, nor satis-
fied his emotional needs.
Today's criminal justice system focuses on the defendant and on
the criminal act against society. By doing so, authorities within the
criminal justice system often ignore the victim of the crime. Not sur-
prisingly, victims of criminal acts have expressed dissatisfaction with
the criminal justice system, which they perceive as inequitably focusing
on the defendant. In response to the problem, victims' advocates have
lobbied state and national policymakers to initiate changes within the
system that would draw greater attention to the victim of the crime. A
criminal justice system that acknowledges and treats the victim's needs
is not objectionable in itself; however, when it affords the victim oppor-
tunities, which advocates refer to as "rights," that directly violate the
defendant's constitutional rights, the system is objectionable. Even so,
sympathetic legislators, in adopting statutes involving victims' rights,
are likely to accede to the demands of victims' advocates while failing
to consider the ramifications to the criminal justice system. Hence, the
courts, which- are removed from the direct political process, are respon-
sible for weighing the benefits of various victim assistance programs
against potential violations of defendants' constitutional rights. State
and federal courts should hold statutes that allow the introduction of




Part II of this Note presents an overview of the victims' rights
movement and analyzes the ensuing outgrowth of statutes allowing the
admission of victim impact evidence at sentencing proceedings. Part III
sets forth a history of Supreme Court death penalty jurisprudence and
considers how the Court has used this line of cases in decisions deter-
mining the admissibility of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing
proceedings. Part IV analyzes how the Court and various state courts
have utilized and commented on Payne v. Tennessee,1 the latest pro-
nouncement by the Court on victim impact evidence. Part V of this
Note sets forth a three-part critical analysis of the Court's decision in
Payne: first, it discusses why victim impact evidence at capital sentenc-
ing plays no role in any of the legitimate theories for punishment; sec-
ond, it considers how some courts have used Payne to admit irrelevant
victim opinion evidence during capital sentencing; and, third, it ex-
plains why the admission of victim impact evidence will lead to dispa-
rate sentencing of similarly situated defendants. Finally, in Part VI,
this Note sets forth conclusions concerning the future of the admissibil-
ity of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing.
II. THE VICTIMS' RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
The victims' rights movement is a viable and active political force
in American society today.2 The growth of victims' rights organizations
is attributable to victims' dissatisfaction with the criminal justice sys-
tem's focus on the defendant and with their perception that the system
pays little attention to their needs.3 Studies identify three common
1. 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991).
2. The victims' rights movement is an active lobbying force: "The National Organization for
Victim Assistance (NOVA) in Washington, D.C., lists some 1,500 members and has worked to per-
suade legislators to improve the lot of victims." Diane Kiesel, Crime and Punishment: Victim
Rights Movement Presses Courts, Legislatures, 70 A.B.A. J. 25, 25 (Jan. 1984). See also Sympo-
sium: Victims' Rights, 11 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1 (1984); Follow-Up Issue on Victims' Rights, 17
Pepperdine L. Rev. 1 (1989).
The victims' rights movement has some strong political allies. Vice-President Dan Quayle re-
cently told a crowd at the Christian Coalition in Sacramento, California that "[i]t's time to put the
rights of victims ahead of the rights of criminals." Jorge Casuso, Clinton "in the Pocket" of ABA,
Quayle says. Chi. Trib. at 5 (Aug. 12, 1992).
3. For example, the Stephanie Roper Committee, which has lobbied the Maryland legislature
for tough sentencing laws and victim protections laws, was formed by Vincent and Roberta Roper,
their friends, and their neighbors, following a court's light sentencing of the convicted murderer of
their daughter. See Maureen McLeod, Victim Participation at Sentencing, 22 Crim. L. Bull. 501
(1986); Melanie Howard, Victims, Families Seek Expanded Legal Rights, Wash. Times A21 (Nov.
10, 1991). Some commentators have echoed victims' beliefs that an imbalance exists in the crimi-
nal justice system. See Donald R. Ranish and David Shichor, The Victim's Role in the Penal
Process: Recent Developments in California, 49 Fed. Probation 50, 50 (March 1985) (stating that
"[t]he focus has for so long been on those who violate the standards of societal behavior and not on
those who have suffered the consequences of criminal activity").
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themes in victims' reactions to the criminal process: (1) victims gener-
ally are dissatisfied with, and thus resentful of, the criminal justice sys-
tem; (2) victims are unable to shed the feelings of shame associated
with being a victim; and (3) victims tend to transfer a sense of disorder,
fear, and powerlessness to other spheres of their lives.4 In response, the
victims' rights movement has advocated legislation recognizing the
rights of victims.5 Victims contend that one of those rights is allowing
them to participate in the sentencing phase of capital trials via victim
impact evidence.
A. The Rise of the Victims' Rights Movement
In the American criminal system, the victim is not responsible for
prosecuting or carrying out the sentence against the defendant.7 Indeed,
the manner in which criminal cases are styled is evidence that the vic-
tim is not the instigator of criminal actions.' Hence, some victims con-
tend that the criminal process excludes them, thereby victimizing them
a second time.9 Over the past three decades, sympathizers have sought
to identify the needs of victims and to respond to them appropriately. 10
The reasons why victims' advocates seek a meaningful role for vic-
tims in the criminal justice system are numerous." But two overriding
motivations exist: initially, some victims' rights advocates believe that
consideration of the victim's views helps the victim regain a sense of
control over her life; and, second, many victims desire retributive jus-
tice.12 A victim often is devastated by the criminal act against her be-
4. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull. at 501.
5. Id. at 502. See also Holly Metz, The Illusion of Victim Rights, 17 Student Lawyer 17, 17
(March 1989) (concluding that "[o]ver the past two decades, the American crime-victims move-
ment has steadily changed the role of victims in the criminal justice system," and that "[h]aving
successfully lobbied for legislation permitting compensation for victims in most jurisdictions, vic-
tim advocates returned to state legislatures seeking the right to be involved in judicial
proceedings").
6. See text accompanying notes 31-33.
7. The idea that a crime against an individual is in fact a crime against society began in
England when the kings solidified their power and when the concept of "the king's peace" pre-
vailed. See Lynne N. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 937, 938-40
(1985). See also Ranish and Shichor, 49 Fed. Probation at 51 (cited in note 3).
8. If Jane Doe is robbed or murdered by Mary Smith in the state of Tennessee, the criminal
case is styled, "The State of Tennessee v. Mary Smith." Jane Doe or her heirs are still free to
initiate a civil case. The action will then be styled, "Jane Doe v. Mary Smith."
9. Howard, Wash. Times at A21 (cited in note 3).
10. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull. at 501-02.
11. Each victim probably has her own motivation for desiring to participate in or refrain
from participating in the criminal justice system. These motivations vary from a need to be left
alone, to a desire for.vengeance, to a sense of duty to society to take an active role in the judicial
process.
12. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull. at 504.
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cause of her resulting feeling of vulnerability and her sense that she has
lost control over her life.13 Consequently, some critics view the victims'
rights movement merely as self-therapy for victims."' But the primary
benefit that the victims' rights movement brings to the criminal justice
system is the enhanced efficiency that results from an increase in victim
participation. 3
During the 1960s, those who led efforts to aid victims concentrated
on establishing compensation programs at the state level and on ex-
panding restitution as a sentencing alternative. 6 The leaders of these
efforts used objective, monetary measures to fix compensation or resti-
tution.' 7 These advocates hoped this economic approach to victims'
rights would serve a restorative function and return victims to pre-
crime conditions.' 8
Thirty-nine states and the District of Columbia have enacted vic-
tim compensation programs.19 Some commentators, however, question
whether compensation programs are helping those who most need the
help-financially poor and disadvantaged victims.2 0 Some advocates,
who have dedicated considerable time and energy to helping victims,
believe that the poor and other minority groups do not benefit from
compensation programs as much as more affluent or white victims.2 '
Further, in addition to seeking monetary damages through the criminal
justice system, many victims look to the civil courts for restitution.22
13. Howard Zehr and Mark Umbreit, Victim-Offender Reconciliation: An Incarceration
Substitute?, 46 Fed. Probation 63, 64 (Dec. 1982).
14. Kiesel, 70 A.B.A. J. at 28 (cited in note 2) (citing David Austern who represented the
family of a murder victim in a civil suit against the convicted murderer).
15. The theory is that once victims feel better about their participation in the criminal jus-
tice system, they, as future victims, or other victims who hear of the first victims' relative ease and
satisfaction with the system, will participate effectively in the system in the future. McLeod, 22
Crim. L. Bull. at 506 (cited in note 3). In other words, "[b]y inviting victim participation in crimi-
nal proceedings, the criminal justice system hopes to increase victim (i.e., consumer) satisfaction,
encourage future victim involvement and, thereby, enhance system efficiency." Id.
However, not everyone agrees that increased victim input enhances efficiency. In one report of
a group of prosecutors and judges, 69% of the prosecutors and 64% of the judges felt that no
increase in the level of victim participation was necessary to increase the efficiency of the judicial
process. Jolene C. Hernon and Brian Forst, The Criminal Justice Response to Victim Harm 54
(National Institute of Justice, 1984).
16. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull. at 501.
17. Id. Objective losses include medical bills, the replacement of stolen, damaged, or de-
stroyed goods, and lost wages.
18. Id.
19. Kiesel, 70 A.B.A. J. at 25.
20. Metz, 17 Student Lawyer at 17 (cited in note 5) (declaring that the powerless and the
underrepresented are absent from the entire victims' rights process).
21. Id. (quoting Judith Rowland, executive director of the nonprofit California Center for
Victimology and director of the Crime Victims' Legal Clinic).
22. The standard of proof in a civil case, preponderance of the evidence, is lower than the
standard of proof in a criminal case, beyond a reasonable doubt, thus making it easier to win a civil
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However, the poor have difficulty recovering in the civil system, since
they lack the funds that are necessary to initiate civil suits. 23
During the 1970s, victims' rights advocates lobbied for the expan-
sion of victim-witness assistance programs. 24 The victim-witness assis-
tance programs serve the purpose of guiding the victim through the
complicated maze of the criminal justice system and minimizing the ad-
ministrative inconveniences associated with participation in the pro-
cess.25 Recently, victims' rights advocates have called for a system that
is more responsive to the needs of the victims-one that assists rather
than manages the victim. 26 Many victims claim that victim services are
meaningless if victims do not have the opportunity to participate in the
criminal process itself.2 7 Government authorities have taken several
steps in response. For instance, the United States Congress enacted the
Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982.28 Additionally, several
suit. Metz, 17 Student Lawyer at 20. Compare Federal Rule of Evidence 301 (Presumptions in
General in Civil Actions and Proceedings) with Federal Rule of Evidence 303 (Presumptions in
Criminal Cases). FRE 303 never was enacted but is reproduced in Eric D. Green and Charles R.
Nesson, Federal Rules of Evidence at 257 (Little, Brown & Co., 1988). FRE 303 was based largely
on the American Law Institute Model Penal Code § 1.12 (1962) and United States v. Gainey, 380
U.S. 63 (1965).
A growing number of victims also are filing suits against third-party defendants whom the
victims allege should have exercised due care in preventing the crime. Kiesel, 70 A.B.A. J. at 27
(cited in note 2).
23. Metz, 17 Student Lawyer at 20 (quoting Frank C. Carrington, Jr., director of the Crime
Victims' Litigation Project in Virginia Beach, Virginia).
24. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull. at 501 (cited in note 3).
25. Advocates urged that the state should have provided child care while the parent was
participating in the criminal proceeding. Additionally, advocates sought transportation aids for
victims and separate victim waiting rooms. Id. at 501-02.
26. Id. See also Deborah P. Kelly, Victims' Perception of Criminal Justice, in Symposium:
Victims' Rights, 11 Pepperdine L. Rev. 1, 15 (1984).
27. For example, Roberta Roper has stated that "[s]ervices are wonderful, but they don't
take the place of fights. . . . Sometimes they are a Band-Aid to cover a larger injury that this
system inflicts." Howard, Wash. Times at A21 (cited in note 3).
28. Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96 Stat. 1248, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1512-1515 (1988) and 18
U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580 (1988). Congress amended Sections 3579 and 3580 and relocated them to 18
U.S.C. §2 3663 and 3664 by Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 212, 98 Stat. 1837, 1987 (1984). The Victim and
Witness Protection Act codified Congressional findings that recognized the importance of victims
in the criminal justice system. Congress found (1) that the system either ignores victims or uses
them to identify and punish offenders; (2) that victims suffer physical, psychological, and financial
hardship as a result of the crime; (3) that the federal government should play a leadership role in
ensuring that the state treats victims properly; (4) that victims do not receive adequate assistance
or protection from the proper authorities; (5) that the state does not provide victims with a coun-
terpart to the defendant's counsel; (6) that the state does not notify victims of the disposition of
the case; (7) that victims have difficulty with transportption, parking, and child care when partici-
pating in the criminal process; and (8) that victims often lose valuable property to criminals and to
law enforcement officials who are gathering evidence. 96 Stat. at 1248.
Further, Congress declared that the purposes of the Victim and Witness Protection Act are:
(1) to enhance and protect the necessary role of crime victims and witnesses in the criminal
justice process; (2) to ensure that the Federal Government does all that is possible within
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states have amended their constitutions to include a "Victims' Bill of
Rights, '2 9 and almost all states along with the District of Columbia,
have provided for the inclusion of victim impact statements in
presentence reports.3 0
B. The Victim Impact Statement
By successfully lobbying for the use of victim impact statements,
the victims' rights movement has ensured that victim harm is consid-
ered in determining the defendant's sentence.3' The federal government
has provided for the use of victim impact statements,32 as has virtually
every state and the District of Columbia."
While almost all states allow for some form of victim input at some
stage in the judicial process, the extent of that involvement varies from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Similarly, the procedure by which the states
allow the conveyance of such information also varies. For example, in
limits of available resources to assist victims and witnesses of crime without infringing on the
constitutional rights of the defendant, and (3) to provide a model for legislation for State and
local governments.
96 Stat. at 1249.
29. For example, victims in South Carolina have a bill of rights that includes the right to
make recommendations regarding pretrial release and the right to make a victim impact state-
ment. These rights are to be "protected by law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, and judges in a
manner no less vigorous than the protections afforded criminal defendants." S.C. Code Ann. § 16-
3-1510 (Law. Co-op. 1985). See also Donald J. Hall, Victims' Voices in Criminal Court: The Need
for Restraint, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 233, 239 (1991).
30. See Richard Lee Slowinski, Note, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibiting the Use of Vic-
tim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 215, 216 n.10;
Phillip A. Talbert, Note, The Relevance of Victim Impact Statements to the Criminal Sentencing
Decision, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 199, 200 n.12; Hall, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 238.
31. Richard J. Murphy, Note, The Significance of Victim Harm: Booth v. Maryland and the
Philosophy of Punishment in the Supreme Court, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1303, 1303 (1988). See also
Michael A. Johnson, Note, The Application of Victim Impact Statements in Capital Cases in the
Aftermath of Booth v. Maryland. An Impact No More?, 13 Thurgood Marshall L. J. 109, 109
(1988) (asserting that "[t]he development of allowing Victim Impact Statements in criminal pro-
ceedings can arguably be seen as a direct result of the victim's rights movement").
32. See note 28 discussing the Victim and Witness Protection Act and its amendment to
Rule 32(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
33. For a complete list of state statutes mandating the inclusion of some form of victim im-
pact statements at sentencing, see Slowinski, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 216 n. 10. 'ihe Virgin Islands
also provides for those of victim impact statements. V. I. Code Ann. tit. 34, § 205 (Supp. 1991).
The only states that do not allow some form of victim impact statements are Alabama, Ha-
waii, and North Dakota. In the Alabama Crime Victims' Court Attendance Act, Alabama has as-
serted that victims have a right to be present in the courtroom. Ala. Code § 15-14-50 (1990).
Further, Hawaii has a victims' bill of rights that provides that the victim be notified regarding the
disposition of the case, that the victim have a secure waiting area during court proceedings, and
that the victim have stolen property returned as soon as. feasible. Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 801D-4
(Supp. 1991). Finally, North Dakota has a Uniform Crime Reparations Act. N.D. Cent. Code § 65-
13-01 (1991). However, none of these states explicitly allow for the admissibility of victim impact
evidence.
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Arizona, the presentence report lists the physical, emotional, and finan-
cial impact of the crime on the victim's family, and the victim or her
immediate family has the right to appear personally or through paid
counsel at any aggravation or mitigation hearing to offer victim input
evidence. 4 While Arizona's laws calling for victim impact statements
are broad, Arkansas is more restrictive in allowing victim input at sen-
tencing. 5 A Delaware statute requires that courts include victim impact
statements in the presentence report whenever the victim wishes,"
while an Iowa statute allows victim statements only upon a court's or-
der. 37 Other statutes go so far as to mandate that the sentencing judge
consider the victim impact statement when making the sentencing
decision."
This Note focuses on all victim impact statements at capital sen-
tencing, despite the fact that only a minimal consensus exists among
the jurisdictions as to the piocedural basis for authorizing such state-
ments.3 9 Furthermore, there is no uniform definition of who constitutes
a victim for purposes of allowing victim impact evidence.40 State law
varies in the type of information that is permissible in a victim impact
statement.41 Additionally, states establish divergent methods for pre-
34. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 12-253(4) (West 1992).
35. Arkansas limits victim input to cases involving DWI ("Driving While Intoxicated") pros-
ecutions. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 5-65-102(3) (Supp. 1991).
36. Del. Code Ann. § 4331(d)-(g) (1987).
37. Iowa Code Ann. § 901.3(5) (West Supp. 1991).
38. See, for example, W. Va. Code § 61-11A-6(a)(5) (1989).
39. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull. at 508-09 (cited in note 3). Some statutes mandate the use of
victim impact statements at all sentencing proceedings. Other states mandate the use of victim
impact statements only as an attachment to the presentence report, which the court possibly will
not order. Further, in these states, the defendant can waive his or her right to the report, thereby
negating the effect of any victim impact evidence.
40. Id. at 509. Some jurisdictions define victim as the person against whom the offense was
committed, or who has suffered as a result of the crime. See, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 258B, § 1 (West 1988). Other jurisdictions have adopted narrower definitions of victims for
purposes of allowing their participation at sentencing. See, for example, Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §
54-91c (West 1985), which only allows a victim to participate if the defendant has either entered a
guilty plea or been found guilty of a Class A, B, or C felony.
41. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull at 510-11. Connecticut, for example, limits the statement to
highly objective and quantifiable losses. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-91c(b) (West 1985). In con-
trast, Minnesota allows the probation officer preparing the statement to include any problems that
the victim has suffered due to the criminal occurrence. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.115(lb)(a) (West
1987).
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paring a victim impact statement 42 and provide different procedures for
allowing the admission of such a statement.43
Regardless of the particular form of victim participation, the harms
associated with such participation are inherent in all schemes that allow
the character of the victim to play a role in capital sentencing. These
harms can be minimized or exacerbated depending on the degree and
manner of participation.4
III. SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF VICTIM
IMPACT EVIDENCE
A state statute mandating victim input at the sentencing phase of a
capital proceeding is only the first step in determining whether such
evidence is admissible. Any state law must comport with the U.S. Con-
stitution,45 more particularly, the Eighth Amendment. 46 The Eighth
Amendment as applied to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment 47
defines the parameters within which a state may impose capital punish-
ment. Hence, the constitutionality of state laws mandating victim im-
pact statements and other forms of victim characterization at capital
proceedings are determined vis-&-vis the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence, which delineates the procedures by which
the states must conform in administering the death penalty. Thus, an
understanding of the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is nec-
essary in order to determine the constitutionality of victim input
statutes.
42. McLeod, 22 Crim. L. Bull at 511-14. The strength and validity of the victim impact state-
ment is affected by authorship (either the victim or the probation officer), derivation (the source of
the information in the statement varies depending on whether a state demands that the probation
officer contact the victim when the probation officer is authoring the report), and verification. The
format of the victim impact statement also may vary. Objective formats include checklists that
state official prepared listing types of loss that a victim could suffer or numerical ranking systems
of how strongly a victim feels about the criminal act and typically create less disparity in sentenc-
ing than do nonstructured, subjective statements. Nonstructured statements, however, give the
victim more freedom to express the harm that the alleged criminal caused.
43. Id. at 514. Typically, the victim impact statement is attached to the presentence report,
although sometimes statements are filed separately or presented orally at the sentencing proce-
dure. Id.
44. See Part V of this Note.
45. States may afford more protection than the United States Constitution, but they must
afford at least as much protection as does the United States Constitution.
46. It states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const., Amend. VIII. The language of the Eighth Amend-
ment derives from the English bill of rights framed in 1688. See Joseph Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution of the United States § 1006 at 710 (Carolina Academic Press, 1987).
47. The applicable portion of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "No state shall . . . deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. Const., Amend. XIV.
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A. Background of Supreme Court Eighth Amendment
Jurisprudence
Courts originally interpreted the Eighth Amendment as barring ex-
cessively painful methods of punishment,48 and until the previous two
decades, the Supreme Court simply assumed that capital punishment
was constitutional.49 However, the Court now has recognized two ap-
proaches to interpreting the Eighth Amendment. The first approach
considers only punishments of torture and unnecessary cruelty as viola-
tive of the Eighth Amendment."0 The second approach interprets the
Eighth Amendment according to "evolving standards of decency."
'51
Since the evolving standard of decency approach emerged in 1958,
courts have used the first approach infrequently.
5 2
In utilizing the evolving standard of decency approach the courts
look to the objective indicia that reflect the public attitude toward a
given sanction.53 The evolving standard of decency, along with the sen-
tencing goals of retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacita-
tion, 4 allow courts to appraise the proportionality between the crime
committed and the punishment imposed, thereby ensuring a close
nexus between the two.55 The Supreme Court has recognized that capi-
tal punishment is unique, due to its severity and its irrevocability, and
thus worthy of heightened procedural safeguards. 56
The Supreme Court provided the modern setting for the debate
over the applicability of capital punishment statutes in its landmark
48. Examples of excessively painful methods of punishment include disembowelling alive,
beheading, burning alive, quartering, and crucifixion. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 264-65
(1972) (Brennan concurring). See also Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134-35 (1878) (stating in
dicta that execution by firing squad is constitutional); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (holding
that execution by electricity is constitutional). However, even as long as a century ago, some mem-
bers of the Supreme Court recognized that the Eighth Amendment went further than simply bar-
ring torture. See O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field dissenting).
49. Welsh S. White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties 4 (Univ. of Mich. 1991). See also
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
50. Slowinski, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 220 (cited in note 30). This approach is backward-
looking, since it analyzes the punishment by comparing it to punishments considered cruel and
unusual at the time the Eighth Amendment was adopted and ratified. See also Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 351 (1910).
51. Slowinsky, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 220; Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
52. Slowinsky, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 221.
53. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 288 (1976). These objective indicia include the
legislatively and judicially imposed sanctions and values as defined by the public, the judiciary,
history, and morals. Id.
54. See Part V.A. of this Note.
55. Slowinsky, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. at 222; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982)
(O'Connor dissenting).
56. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 187 (1976).
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decision Furman v. Georgia.5 7 In Furman, the Court held that a Geor-
gia statute that gave a jury absolute and unguided discretion to impose
the death penalty violated the Eighth Amendment.5 s The Court issued
the holding in Furman by a cursory per curiam opinion; each of the five
concurring justices wrote a separate opinion. 9 Justices Brennan and
Marshall each concluded that capital punishment violates the Eighth
Amendment."0 Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White each concurred on
much narrower grounds: they would have held that the death penalty is
violative of the Eighth Amendment only when it is imposed capri-
ciously. 1 Because the Justices wrote five separate opinions, the law be-
came unclear as to when capital sentencing would violate the Eighth
Amendment.
62
Four years later, the Court held in Gregg v. Georgia6 that the
death penalty did not violate the Eighth Amendment per se. The stat-
ute at issue demanded a bifurcated trial; following the guilt phase, the
court would hold a sentencing hearing to weigh aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances." The Court affirmed the notion that capital pun-
ishment may be an appropriate punishment in extreme cases, as an
expression of society's belief that some offenses are so grievous an af-
57. 408 U.S. 238 (1972); See also Robert P. Gritton, Note, Capital Punishment: New Weap-
ons in the Sentencing Process, 24 Ga. L. Rev. 423, 427 (1990).
58. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972).
59. Each of the dissenters also filed separate opinions.
60. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan concurring); id. at 370-71 (Marshall concurring). Jus-
tice Brennan used a four-part test to reach his conclusion:
If a punishment is unusually severe, if there is a strong probability that it is inflicted arbitrar-
ily, if it is substantially rejected by contemporary society, and if there is no reason to believe
that it serves any penal purpose more effectively than some less severe punishment, then the
continued infliction of that punishment violates the command of the Clause that the State
may not inflict inhuman and uncivilized punishments upon those convicted of crimes.
Id. at 282 (Brennan concurring). Justice Marshall focused on the last two factors. Id. at 358 (Mar-
shall concurring).
61. Justice Stewart wrote: "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way
that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and
murders in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a capri-
ciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed." Id.
at 309-10 (Stewart concurring).
Justice Douglas wrote that "the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal
laws that are evenhanded, nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups." Id. at 256
(Douglas concurring).
62. Clearly, leaving the decision solely to the jury with no guidance would violate the Eighth
Amendment; however, the Court did not give the states much further guidance regarding how to
frame constitutional capital sentencing statutes.
63. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). The Court decided Gregg with two companion cases: Proffitt v. Flor-
ida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976), and Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
64. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 163-64.
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front to humanity that death is an appropriate response. 5 The Court in
Gregg, however, reaffirmed the Furman Court's notion that when a sen-
tencing body is afforded discretion on a matter so grave as the determi-
nation of whether to impose the death penalty, that discretion must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of arbitrary and
capricious action.66
The Court decided Woodson v. North Carolina"1 on the same day
that it decided Gregg. In an attempt to conform with Furman, the
North Carolina Legislature had revised its statutes to make capital
punishment mandatory for certain offenses. These statutes were at is-
sue in Woodson.6 s The Court struck down the North Carolina legisla-
tive scheme because it failed to treat the defendants as uniquely
individual human beings; rather, the Court ruled that the North Caro-
lina statutes treated defendants as members of a faceless, undifferenti-
ated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death. 9  Hence, the Woodson Court promoted individualized
sentencing. °
The Woodson and Gregg decisions articulated two goals, which are
somewhat conflicting.11 On the one hand, the Furman and Gregg Courts
instructed state legislatures to direct juries when to impose the death
penalty, while on the other hand the Woodson Court instructed the leg-
islatures not to dictate to juries when to impose the death penalty.
7 2
Through this tension a principle of "guided discretion" appeared, by
which the state provided a jury with a list of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances upon which it should base its sentencing decision.73
While the Court never has resolved this tension explicitly, in Lockett v.
Ohio74 it indicated that promoting individualized sentencing is the more
important of the two goals.75
65. Id. at 184.
66. Id. at 189. See also White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties at 5 (cited in note 49)
(stating that "although Gregg upheld the constitutionality of the new system of capital punish-
ment, it seemed to require that the system operate so as to minimize the unfair and arbitrary
selection of those who would die").
67. 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
68. Id. at 286 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-17 (Supp. 1975)).
69. Id. at 303-05. See also Kevin J. McCoy, Note, Preserving Integrity in Capital Sentenc-
ing: Booth v. Maryland, 22 Creighton L. Rev. 333, 340-41 (1988). The Court also held that Furman
stood for the prohibition of any type of standardless sentencing by the jury. Woodson, 428 U.S. at
302-03.
70. White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties at 5-6 (cited in note 49).
71. Id. The two goals can be phrased as (1) evenhanded capital sentencing (neither arbitrary
nor capricious), and (2) individualized capital sentencing. Id.
72. See notes 57-70 and accompanying text.
73. See Murphy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1315 (cited in note 31).
74. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
75. White, The Death Penalty in the Nineties at 6. The Court held that the sentencing
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The Court further focused on the individual defendant in Zant v.
Stephens.76 In Zant, the Court held that the jury, in determining whom
amongst those statutorily eligible to receive the death penalty actually
should be sentenced to death, can consider nonstatutory factors as long
as it bases its ultimate decision on the individual defendant's character
and the particular circumstances of the crime.77
Recently, the Court retreated from the individualized approach to
capital sentencing. In Blystone v. Pennsylvania," the Court upheld a
Pennsylvania scheme that requires the death penalty when a jury either
unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance and no miti-
gating circumstances as to the commission of the crime or when the
jury finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances.7" The defendant in Blystone argued that consistent with
prior Court rulings, the jury must be free of a legislative mandate to
impose or not impose the death penalty." In rejecting the defendant's
argument, the Court simply stated, "[t]he requirement of individualized
sentencing in capital cases is satisfied by allowing the jury to consider
all relevant mitigating evidence." '
B. Booth v. Maryland: The Court's First Look at Victim Impact
Evidence in a Capital Case
The Court first analyzed the use of victim impact statements at the
sentencing stage of a capital case in Booth v. Maryland.2 In Booth,
authority cannot be prevented from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of the defend-
ant's character nor any of the circumstances of the crime that the defendant offers as a basis for
imposing a sentence less than death. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604. The Court in Lockett held that the
sentencing authority always must consider all mitigating factors except in the rarest kind of capital
case. The Court reiterated this holding in Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
The Court, in a footnote in Lockett, indicated that a mandatory death sentence may be appro-
priate "when a prisoner-or an escapee-under a life sentence is found guilty of murder." Id. at
604 n.11. However, in Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66 (1987), the Court held that to impose a
mandatory death sentence for murder committed while the defendant is serving a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is unconstitutional.
76. 462 U.S. 862 (1983). Zant challenged his death sentence after the Georgia Supreme Court
held that one of the three aggravating circumstances that made him eligible for the death penalty
was unconstitutional. Id. at 867. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence based on the other two
aggravating factors. Id. at 890-91.
77. Id. at 878-79.
78. Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990).
79. Id. The evidence showed that Blystone picked up a hitchhiker, robbed him, and shot
him. The jury convicted Blystone of first degree murder and robbery. Blystone admitted no miti-
gating evidence at sentencing. The jury, consistent with the verdict, found an aggravating circum-
stance in that Blystone committed the killing while in the perpetration of a felony, and, pursuant
to the Pennsylvania statute, it sentenced the defendant to death.
80. Id. at 302.
81. Id. at 307.
82. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
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John Booth and an accomplice robbed and murdered an elderly couple
in their home.83 The jury convicted Booth on two counts of first-degree
murder, two counts of robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery. 4
Upon the conviction, the prosecutor sought the death penalty and
Booth elected to have a jury impose his sentence.85 Prior to sentencing,
the State Division of Parole and Probation had compiled a presentence
report.86 Maryland law required the report to include a victim impact
statement describing the effect of the crime on the victim and the vic-
tim's family.8 7 At sentencing, the prosecutor read the victim impact
statement to the jury. The statement consisted of the victims' family's
comments 8 concerning the personal characteristics of the victims, 9 the
emotional problems faced by the victims' family,90 and the family mem-
bers' feelings about the defendant.9 1
83. Id. at 498. Booth and Willis Reid broke into the home of Rose and Irvin Bronstein in
May 1983 in order to steal money to finance the purchase of heroin. Booth v. State, 507 A.2d 1098,
1103 (Md. 1986). Booth and Reid bound and gagged the victims and stabbed each 12 times in the
chest with a kitchen knife. Id.
84. Booth, 482 U.S. at 498.
85. Id. See Md. Code Ann. § 413(b) (1982).
86. The report included a description of Booth's background, education and employment his-
tory, and criminal record. 482 U.S. at 498.
87. Md. Code Ann. § 4-609(d) (1986). The victim impact statement, under Maryland law,
was intended to:
i) Identify the victim of the offense; (ii) Itemize any economic loss suffered by the victim as a
result of the offense; (iii) Identify any physical injury suffered by the victim as a result of the
offense along with its seriousness and permanence; (iv) Describe any change in the victim's
personal welfare or familial relationships as a result of the offense; (v) Identify any request for
psychological services initiated by the victim of the victim's family as a result of the the
offense; and (vi) Contain any other information related to the impact of the offense upon the
victim or the victim's family that the trial court requires.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 498-99 (quoting Md. Code Ann. § 4-609(c)(3)).
88. The victim impact statement was based on interviews with the victims' son, daughter,
son-in-law, and granddaughter. Id. at 499. The entire victim impact statement is reproduced as an
appendix to Booth v. Maryland. Id. at 509-15.
89. The victim impact statement included evidence of the victims' characteristics including
the following: "The victims' son reports that his parents had been married for fifty-three years and
enjoyed a very close relationship, spending each day together. He states that his father had worked
hard all his life and had been retired for eight years. He describes his mother as a woman who was
young at heart and never seemed like an old lady." Id. at 510.
90. The victim impact statement continued: "The victims' granddaughter ... described the
impact of the tragedy most eloquently when she stated that it was a completely devastating and
life altering experience .. " The victims' son states that he suffers from a lack of sleep. He is
unable to drive on the streets that pass near his parents' home." Id. at 511.
91. The victim impact statement included statements and opinions about the crime: "The
victims' son feels that his parents were not killed, but were butchered like animals. He doesn't
think anyone should be able to do something like that and get away with it." Id. at 512. "The
victims' daughter ... states that her parents were stabbed repeatedly with viciousness and she
could never forgive anyone far killing them that way ... She doesn't feel that the people who
could do this could ever be rehabilitated and she doesn't want them to be able to do this again or
put another family through this." Id. at 513.
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Booth objected to the admission of the victim impact statement
arguing that it was unduly inflammatory and irrelevant.9 2 The trial
court overruled the objection,9" and the Maryland Court of Appeals up-
held the conviction and concluded that the statement was a relatively
straightforward and factual description of the effects of the murders on
the members of the victims' family. 4 The Supreme Court reversed the
death sentence, holding that the introduction of the victim impact
statement in a capital sentencing violated the Eighth Amendment. 5
The Court, through Justice Powell, acknowledged that it usually
defers to state legislatures' determinations as to which factors are rele-
vant in the sentencing decision. 8 The Court determined, however, that
the jury must make an individualized determination based upon the in-
dividual's character and the circumstances of the crime, and that a
state statute which requires a jury to consider other factors must be
scrutinized to ensure that only evidence that has a bearing on the de-
fendant's personal responsibility and moral guilt be admitted. 7 The
Court characterized the information contained within the victim impact
statement in two categories. First was the information that described
the personal characteristics of the victims and the emotional impact of
the crimes on the family.98 Second was the information that set forth
the family members' opinions and characterizations of the crime and
the defendant.9 9
The Court held that allowing the statement to contain the first cat-
egory of information is unconstitutional because it does not conform
with the Woodson'"° requirement that the jury focus on the defendant
as an individual. 110' The Court ruled that to allow the jury to consider
such information would result in the imposition of the death sentence
92. Id. at 500. Booth's counsel contended that the statement violated the Eighth Amend-
ment. Id. at 500-01.
93. Id. at 501. Upon the court's ruling, Booth's counsel requested that the prosecutor read
the statement, rather than allow the victims' family to testify before the jury. The prosecutor
complied with this request. Id.
94. Booth, 507 A.2d at 1124.
95. Booth, 482 U.S. at 509. Booth was a 5-4 decision with Justice Powell writing for the
majority, joined by Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice White filed a dissenting
opinion, joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Scalia. Justice Scalia filed a dissenting opinion,
joined by Rehnquist, O'Connor, and White.
96. Id. at 502. The Court did note, however, that the Constitution does set limits on the




100. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
101. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504. The Court found that the first type of information was "wholly
unrelated to the blameworthiness of a particular defendant." Id.
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based on factors of which the defendant was unaware and which were
irrelevant to the defendant's decision to commit the crime.
102
The Court also held that the second type of information found in
the victim impact statement, the victim's family's characterization of
the defendant and the crime, is inadmissible because its only purpose is
to inflame the jury and divert it from deciding a sentence based upon
the relevant evidence concerning the crime and the defendant.103
Hence, the Court ruled that the admission of emotionally-charged vic-
tim impact evidence is inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking
that the Constitution demands in capital cases. 104
The Court articulated three concerns that influenced its decision to
bar victim impact statements. 105 The first concern was that one victim's
family may be more articulate than another victim's family thereby re-
sulting in arbitrary decisions as to whether to impose the death pen-
alty. '6 The second concern was that a jury should not make a capital
decision based on other people's perception of the victim's character. 07
Third, the Court was concerned that the defendant could not rebut vic-
tim impact statements because any attempted rebuttal by the defend-
ant would result in a mini-trial that would distract the jury from its
appointed duty of determining the appropriate sentence that it should
impose. o10
102. Id. at 505.
103. Id. at 508. The Court stated that "any decision to impose the death sentence must 'be,
and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.'" Id. (quoting Gardner v. Flor.
ida, 430 U.S. at 358 (1977)).
104. 482 U.S. at 508-09.
105. Id. at 505-07. See also Regina A. Jones, Comment, Booth v. Maryland, 107 S. Ct. 2529
(1987), 19 Rutgers L. J. 1159, 1163 (1988).
106. 482 U.S. at 505. The Court also noted that some victims may not leave behind any
family. Id.
107. Id. at 506 (stating that "[tihis type of information does not provide a 'principled way to
distinguish [cases] in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was
not") (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 433 (1980)).
108. Booth, 482 U.S. at 506-07. The Court questioned whether a defendant could effectively
cross-examine victim impact evidence. Could a defendant show that a victim's family member ex-
aggerated grief or anguish, or lied about the number of his sleepless nights? More importantly,
though, the Court noted that allowing such testimony would open the doors for defendants to
place into evidence testimony that the victim was "of dubious moral character, was unpopular, or
was ostracized from his family." Id. at 507. The unfavorable characteristics of the victim are irrele-
vant to the sentencing decision.
In dissent, Justices White, Scalia, and O'Connor argued that the harm to the victim's family
caused by the crime is relevant to the defendant's personal responsibility. Justice White argued
that according to the language in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), the death penalty is a
proper sanction when society decides that the crime is such an affront to humanity that death is
the only adequate response and that the affront to humanity extends beyond the murder victims
themselves to the family and to the rest of society. Booth, 482 U.S. at 515 (White dissenting). He
also argued that a state could include as a sentencing condition the particularized harm that an
individual's murder causes to the victim's family. Id. at 517 (White dissenting). Finally, he con-
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C. South Carolina v. Gathers: The Extension of Booth to
Encompass Victim Characteristics
Following the Court's decision in Booth, the lower courts seemed
confused about the scope of its holding. e09 For instance, in People v.
Ghent,"10 the Supreme Court of California upheld the imposition of a
death sentence, notwithstanding the prosecutor's reference to the im-
pact of the victim's death on the victim's family during the sentencing
phase of the trial."' Other states however, read the Booth decision for
the broad proposition that any injection of the characteristics of the
victim into the determination of capital sentencing violates the Eighth
Amendment.
1 2
Two years after Booth, the Supreme Court clarified its holding in
South Carolina v. Gathers, 83 squarely addressing the admissibility of
victim-related information at capital sentencing. A jury had convicted
Gathers of murder and sentenced him to death."14 The victim was a
self-proclaimed minister who generally carried several bags containing
religious items." 5 During the guilt phase of the trial, the prosecution
entered these religious items into evidence without objection." 6 At sen-
tencing, the prosecution offered no new evidence, but included a char-
acterization of the victim as a religious person and, based on a voting
tended that the ability of the family to articulate its harm is analogous to the differing ability of
prosecutors or witnesses to communicate facts and that "there is no requirement in capital cases
that the evidence and argument be reduced to the lowest common denominator." Id. at 518 (White
dissenting).
109. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 813 (1989) (O'Connor dissenting).
110. 739 P.2d 1250 (Cal. 1987).
111. The California Supreme Court noted that the prosecutor's reference to the loss for the
family was brief and mild, and dissimilar from the facts in Booth. The court concluded that the
comments caused minimal, if any, prejudicial effect. Id. at 1271. Other state courts also read Booth
narrowly, holding that it did not prohibit prosecutors from making arguments concerning the per-
sonal characteristics of the victim. See, for example, Daniels v. State, 528 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988),
and Moon v. State, 375 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1988).
112. For example, see State v. Gathers, 369 S.E.2d 140 (S.C. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 805 (1990).
113. 490 U.S. 805 (1990). Gathers was a 5-4 decision, with Justice Brennan delivering the
opinion for the majority, joined by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice White
filed a brief concurring opinion. Justice White's opinion, in its entirety, reads: "Unless Booth v.
Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987), is to be overruled, the judgment below must be affirmed. Hence, I
join Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court." Id. at 812 (White concurring). Justice O'Connor
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Rehnquist and Kennedy joined. Justice Scalia also filed
a dissenting opinion.
114. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 806. Gathers and three others attacked Richard Haynes in a public
park and beat him severely after Haynes refused to speak to Gathers. Gathers then rummaged
through the victim's belongings. Gathers departed but later returned and stabbed Haynes to
death. Id. at 815 (O'Connor dissenting).
115. Id. at 807. Haynes carried Bibles, rosary beads, plastic statues, and olive oil. On the
evening he was murdered he also was carrying a religious tract entitled "The Game Guy's Prayer."
116. Id. All the evidence at the guilt phase was subsequently readmitted into evidence at the
sentencing phase, again with no objection. Id. at 808.
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registration card in the victim's possession on the night of the murder,
as a citizen who believed in the community.
11
7
The Court in Gathers refused to distinguish between the admissi-
bility of evidence of the victim's characteristics as offered by the vic-
tim's family or by the prosecutor. 118 The Court reiterated that in
considering whether to impose the death penalty the jury must tailor
the punishment to the defendant's personal responsibility and moral
guilt ' 9 in a manner proportionate to the defendant's blameworthi-
ness.'20 Further, the Court noted that Booth left open the issue of
whether a court may admit victim impact statements or victim-related
information if they are directly related to the circumstances of the
crime. 12' In Gathers, the voting registration card and the religious items
themselves were relevant to the circumstances of the crime;1 2 however,
the contents of the card and of the religious items were not relevant.'
23
Hence, because the victim-related information in Gathers was suffi-
ciently similar to that in Booth, the Court found the evidence to be
inadmissible at sentencing.'
24
117. Id. at 808-10. A substantial portion of the prosecutor's remarks are reproduced in Gath-
ers, including the reading of the "Game Guy's Prayer."
118. Id. at 811.
119. Id. at 810 (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801).
120. Id. (quoting Enmund, 458 U.S. at 825 (O'Connor dissentihg)); Tison v. Arizona, 482
U.S. 137, 149 (1987)).
121. Id. at 811 (quoting Booth, 482 U.S. at 507 n.10).
122. Id. The items were scattered about and thus, arguably, were evidence of the defendant's
utter disregard for another human being's integrity and privacy.
123. Id. The Court stated that no evidence existed to show that the defendant had read the
cards. The Court argued that the content of the cards was "purely fortuitous and cannot provide
any information relevant to the defendant's moral culpability." Id. at 811-12.
124. Id. at 810-12. Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, stated that she was willing to overturn
Booth. But she also argued that overturning Booth was not necessary in order to uphold Gathers'
death sentence. Id. at 813-14 (O'Connor dissenting). O'Connor argued for the adoption of a narrow
reading of Booth, one that would allow a jury to consider information about the victim in deter-
mining the sentence. Id. at 814 (O'Connor dissenting). Justice O'Connor favored this view because
she believed that the Eighth Amendment required that a sentence be proportional to the harm
caused and to the defendant's blameworthiness. Id. (O'Connor dissenting). She criticized the Court
for mandating that juries consider all relevant information concerning the defendant yet limiting
the information it may consider concerning the victim:
More fundamentally, this case illustrates the one-sided nature of the moral judgment that the
Court's broad reading of Booth would require of the capital sentencer. This Court has consist-
ently required that a jury at the penalty phase be allowed to consider a wide range of infor-
mation concerning the background of the defendant.
Id. at 817 (O'Connor dissenting).
Justice O'Connor also argued that retribution is one concept that society utilizes in determin-
ing punishments. Id. at 818 (O'Connor dissenting) (stating that "[ilndeed, we have expressly noted
that while 'retribution is an element of all punishments society imposes,' it 'clearly plays a more
prominent role in a capital case' ") (quoting Spaiziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 462 (1984)). She
contended that the moral culpability of the defendant is at the heart of the retribution theory and
that the harm the defendant caused is an essential factor in determining the defendant's culpabil-
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D. Payne v. Tennessee: The Court's Turn-Around
Because of the strong dissents delivered in Booth and Gathers and
the new appointments to the Supreme Court, commentators foresaw
the demise of the two decisions.12 The face of the Supreme Court has
changed considerably since Booth,"' and this change allowed the dis-
senters in Gathers to accomplish their goal of overruling Booth.
2 7
In Payne, a jury convicted Pervis Tyrone Payne on two counts of
first-degree murder and on one count of assault. The jury sentenced
him to death on each of the murders and to thirty years imprisonment
on the assault. 2 8 Payne spent the morning of the murders drinking
beer and injecting himself with cocaine."29 Later that day, Payne en-
tered the victims' apartment and made sexual advances toward one of
his eventual victims, Charisse Christopher. 3 0  Christopher rebuffed
Payne, and he responded by stabbing her and her two young children
repeatedly.'' Police confronted Payne upon his departure from the
ity. Id. (O'Connor dissenting). Justice O'Connor concluded that "in determining the proper pun-
ishment, nothing in the Eighth Amendment prevents the community from considering its loss nor
requires that the victim remain a faceless stranger at the sentencing phase of a capital trial." Id. at
821 (O'Connor dissenting).
Justice Scalia, in his separate dissent, argued that the Court should overrule Booth. Id. at 823
(Scalia dissenting). Justice Scalia boldly argued for overturning a decision handed down only two
years prior, declaring that the Court should overrule Booth before it becomes entrenched in soci-
ety's laws. Id. at 824-25 (Scalia dissenting).
125. See, for example, Susan Annience Jump, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Admissibility of Vic-
tim Impact Statements During Sentencing Phase of Capital Murder Trials, 21 Ga. L. Rev. 1191,
1213 n. 126 (1987); Charlton T. Howard, III, Note, Booth v. Maryland-Death Knell for the Vic-
tim Impact Statement?, 47 Md. L. Rev. 701, 731 n. 163 (1988).
126. Justice Powell, who wrote for the majority in Booth, retired in 1987 and Anthony Ken-
nedy replaced him. Justice Brennan, who joined the Booth decision and authored the Gathers
decision, retired in 1990, and David Souter replaced him. Most recently, Justice Marshall, who
joined in the Booth and Gathers majorities, retired in 1991, and Clarence Thomas replaced him.
The appointment of Justice Thomas did not affect Payne v. Tennessee, because Justice Marshall's
dissent in that case was his last opinion from the bench.
127. See Payne v. Tennessee, 111 S. Ct. 2597 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion for the Court, joined by Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter. Justice
White joined the Payne majority because there were enough votes to overturn Booth. See note 113.
Justice O'Connor filed a concurring opinion, joined by Justices White and Kennedy. Justice Scalia
filed a concurring opinion, joined in part by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Justice Souter filed a
concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kennedy. Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justice
Blackmun, as did Justice Stevens, also joined by Justice Blackmun.
128. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Tenn. 1990). The jury convicted Payne of murdering
28-year-old Charisse Christopher and her two-year-old daughter Lacie. The jury also convicted
Payne of assaulting Charisse's three-year-old son, Nicholas.
129. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2601.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 2601-02. Payne stabbed the victims with a butcher knife. Charisse sustained 42
direct knife wounds and 42 defensive wounds on her arms and hands. Payne stabbed Lacie, one of
the children, in the chest, abdomen, back, and head. Nicholas, the other child, survived, despite
several knife wounds that completely penetrated his body.
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scene, but he escaped at that time. 132 Police apprehended him later that
same day.'33
Despite the overwhelming physical evidence against him, 34 Payne
testified that he had heard moans coming from the victims' apartment,
had attempted to help the victims, had fled at the sound of the sirens,
and had not hurt any of the victims.' But the jury convicted Payne on
all counts. 36 At sentencing Payne presented the testimony of four wit-
nesses,137 one of whom testified that Payne was a caring and devoted
person who did not drink or use drugs, and that his character would not
allow him to commit the crimes for which he was convicted. 38 A clinical
psychologist testified that Payne was mentally handicapped, 139 yet he
was the most polite prisoner that he had ever met.
4
1
One of the two witnesses that the state presented at sentencing was
Charisse Christopher's mother, Mary Zvolanek.14 1 In response to a
question on how the murders affected her grandson, Nicholas, Ms. Zvo-
lanek responded:
He cries for his mom. He doesn't seem to understand why she doesn't come home.
And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and
asks me, Grandma, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried
about my Lacie.14'
In arguing for the death penalty, the prosecutor referred to Nicholas's
consciousness during and after the attack and told the jury: "There is
obviously nothing you can do for Charisse and Lacie Jo. But there is
something that you can do for Nicholas.' ' 143 The prosecutor also told
the jury that Payne's attorney wanted the jury to think about the' de-
fendant's positive characteristics and did not want them to consider the
people who loved the victims (implying that they should consider the
132. Id. at 2601.
133. Id. at 2602.
134. Id. Payne's baseball cap was snapped on Lacie's arm. The police found three cans of
malt liquor with Payne's fingerprints near the bodies. When apprehended, Payne had blood on his
body and clothes that matched the victims' blood types. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. His mother and father, a friend named Bobbie Thomas, and Dr. John T. Huston, a
clinical psychologist with a specialty in criminal court evaluation work, testified on Payne's behalf.
Id.
138. Id. (testimony of Bobbie Thomas).
139. Id. (testimony of Dr. John T. Huston). He based this testimony on Payne's low score on
an IQ test. Id.
140. Id. (testimony of Dr. John T. Huston).
141. State v. Payne, 791 S.W.2d at 17.




victims' family). He further emphasized the loss that Nicholas felt.144
The jury imposed the death penalty.
145
The Supreme Court of Tennessee affirmed the conviction and sen-
tence, characterizing Ms. Zvolanek's testimony as technically irrelevant
and finding that it did not create an unacceptable risk of an arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty. 46 In order to reconsider Booth and
Gathers, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.'
4
1
In Payne, the Court found that Booth and Gathers were based
upon two premises: first, that evidence relating to the harm a capital
defendant caused to the victim's family does not reflect upon the de-
fendant's blameworthiness, and second, that only evidence relating to
blameworthiness is relevant to the capital sentencing decision.' 48 The
Court took issue with these premises, arguing that the harm a defend-
ant caused is an important concern in criminal law."14 Further, the
Payne Court took issue with the Booth Court's reading of previous Su-
preme Court cases which held that courts could not prevent defendants
from offering any relevant mitigating evidence at sentencing, 5 ' and
held that courts should view capital defendants as unique human be-
ings at sentencing.1'5 The Court interpreted the Supreme Court juris-
prudence as proscribing a class of evidence that a court must receive,
mitigating evidence, not as describing a class of evidence which it could
not receive, victim impact evidence. 52 The Payne Court argued that
the Booth Court's reading of precedent unfairly weighted the scales in a
capital trial in favor of the defendant.
153
The Payne Court rejected the Booth Court's argument that courts
should disallow evidence of the victim's character because defendants
would have difficulty in rebutting such evidence.' 5 4 The Court argued
that tactical considerations do not affect the admissibility of the evi-
dence and that the factfinder should determine the relevant weight of
such evidence. 5 5 The Court also rejected the argument that victim im-
144. Id. at 2603.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 2603-04.
147. Id. at 2604. The Court found that although the prosecution did not offer the evidence at
question in Payne in conjunction with a victim impact statement, "its purpose and effect was
much the same as if it had been." Id. at 2606.
148. Id. at 2605.
149. Id. The Court looked to Biblical writings ("[a]n eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth,"
Exodus 21:22-23), English law, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as examples in which
sentences depend on the harm caused. Id. at 2605-06.
150. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982). See also Skipper v. South Carolina, 476
U.S. 1 (1986).
151. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
152. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2607.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 898 (1983)).
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pact evidence will encourage comparative judgments between types of
victims. 156 The Court found that victim impact statements do not lead
to arbitrary decisions to impose the death penalty and that the state
has the prerogative to allow victim impact evidence at capital sentenc-
ing hearings.'57
The Payne Court further argued that if any such evidence was un-
fairly prejudicial, the due process clause provided a mechanism for re-
lief.' 58 Hence, the Court held that Booth deprives the state of "the full
moral force" of its evidence and prevents the jury from considering all
the facts necessary to sentence the defendant appropriately. 15 The
Court added that the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to the
admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on
that subject during capital sentencing. 6 0
Justice Souter concurred with the Court's opinion to the extent
that it excluded the following two categories of evidence, which Booth
and Gathers also had excluded: evidence regarding the individuality of
the victim and evidence concerning the impact of the crime on the vic-
tim's family.' Justice Souter, however, in contrast to the Court, did
not rest his decision to overrule Booth and Gathers solely on constitu-
tional grounds.'62 He argued that the Booth standard was unworkable
and that it would produce arbitrary results and uncertain application. 63
He reached this conclusion by analyzing the interaction of three facts:
first, Booth's restriction of admissible evidence stretched beyond the
156. Id. The Court argued that such testimony was not designed to compare between types
of victims, but rather to inform the jury that the victim was a unique human being.
157. Id. at 2608.
158. Id. See also Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83 (1986).
159. 111 S. Ct. at 2608.
160. Id. at 2609. The Court limited its holding to the holdings of Booth and Gathers, that is,
that evidence relating to the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family are inad-
missible at a capital sentencing proceeding. The Court did not address the admissibility of evi-
dence of a victim's family members' characterization of the crime or defendant, or an opinion on
the sentence to be imposed. Id. at 2611 n.2.
Addressing the question of stare decisis, the Court argued that while stare decisis is preferred,
it is not an inexorable command and should be abandoned when precedent is unworkable or is
poorly reasoned. Id. at 2609. The Court stated that both Booth and Gathers were decided by
narrow margins and over spirited dissents that questioned the basic premises of those decisions.
The Court also contended that members of the Court have questioned Booth and Gathers and that
state courts have inconsistently applied these decisions. Id. at 2610-11.
161. Id. at 2614 (Souter concurring).
162. Id. at 2616 (Souter concurring). If the Court desired to overrule Booth and Gathers, it
should have done so on narrower grounds, as Justice Souter suggested, and it should have avoided
the constitutional question if possible. Mark W. Cannon and David M. O'Brien, Views from the
Bench: The Judiciary and Constitutional Politics 123 (Chatham House, 1985) (quoting Justice
Felix Frankfuter's statement that "[tihis Court reaches constitutional issues last, not first"). See
also Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341-56 (1936) (Brandeis concurring).
163. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2616 (Souter concurring).
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prepared victim impact statement to any victim impact evidence, how-
ever derived; second, details of which the defendant was unaware likely
will be admitted at the guilt stage of trial;1 64 and third, the same jury
that determines guilt usually will determine or recommend the sen-
tence.'65 Thus, Justice Souter concluded that Booth raises a practical
dilemma: if its standard applies at the guilt phase of the trial, capital
trials would be incomprehensible, because facts necessary for a jury's
understanding of the crime would be omitted simply because those
facts were also indicative of the victim's characteristics. But, if Booth
does not apply at the guilt phase, it does not meet its stated objective
because the jury would hear evidence of the victim's characteristics. 6'
Souter concluded that the Court should overrule Booth since the stan-
dard was unworkable.
Justice Stevens was concerned with the majority's trivialization of
the doctrine of stare decisis, and he also argued that even if Booth and
Gathers had not been decided that the Court incorrectly decided
Payne.167 He reiterated the Booth majority's arguments' 6" and took is-
sue with the Payne majority's argument that the scales of the criminal
system must be balanced.6 9 Justice Stevens noted that the Constitu-
tion grants rights to the defendant and, in order to protect individuals,
places limits on the disproportionately powerful State. 70 He further ar-
gued that harm to the victim may justify enhanced punishment only if
the defendant could have foreseen such harm, but that victim impact
statements offer evidence of unforeseeable harm.' 7'
Justice Marshall opened his dissent by contending that "[p]ower,
not reason, is the new currency of this Court's decisionmaking.' ' 72 Jus-
tice Marshall argued that since the Booth and Gathers decisions,
neither the law nor the facts underlying the decisions had changed; only
the members of the Court had changed.17 3 Justice Marshall added that
the Booth and Gathers decisions answered every argument that the
164. For example, if a victim's family witnessed a murder without the defendant's knowl-
edge, then the family members' testimony at the guilt stage of trial will introduce a detail of the
crime of which the defendant was unaware-the existence of the victim's family at the scene of the
crime.
165. Id. (Souter concurring).
166. Id. at 2617 (Souter concurring).
167. Id. at 2625 (Stevens dissenting).
168. Id. at 2626-27 (Stevens dissenting). See text accompanying notes 96-108.
169. Id. at 2627 (Stevens dissenting) (declaring that "[t]he premise that a criminal prosecu-
tion requires an even-handed balance between the State and the defendant is also incorrect").
170. Id. (Stevens dissenting).
171. Id. at 2628 (Stevens dissenting).
172. Id. at 2619 (Marshall dissenting).
173. Id. (Marshall dissenting).
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Payne majority offered.174 He admitted that stare decisis is not an inex-
orable command but stressed that the Court previously had departed
from precedent only (1) upon a showing of a "special justification,'
175
including subsequent changes in the law,17 6 (2) upon showing that a
precedent was incoherent or inconsistent,17 7 or (3) if new circumstances
or facts created a need to change precedent. 78 Justice Marshall con-
tended that the majority did not even attempt to show a special justifi-
cation, 11 and he found their opinion especially disturbing because it
offered no standard by which it would overturn cases in the future.
80
IV. How COURTS HAvE INTERPRETED PAYNE
Although the Court decided Payne only last year, federal and state
courts already have cited it numerous times. The Supreme Court has
not reconsidered its decision in Payne, but it has addressed similar is-
sues in subsequent rulings. 8' Many state courts have validated state
laws that allow the admission of victim impact evidence at capital sen-
tencing hearings. 82 However, at least one state court has refused to al-
low the admission of victim impact evidence at capital sentencing
hearings, despite the Court's holding in Payne.8
A. The Supreme Court After Payne
The Supreme Court twice has commented on Payne. The Court
first commented on Payne in summarily denying an appeal by an in-
mate on death row who sought to introduce the testimony of family
174. Id. at 2620 (Marshall dissenting).
175. Id. at 2621 (Marshall dissenting) (quoting Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)).
176. Id. (Marshall dissenting) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173
(1989)).
177. Id. at 2622 (Marshall dissenting) (quoting Patterson, 491 U.S. at 173).
178. Id. at 2621-22 (Marshall dissenting) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285
U.S. 393, 412 (1932) (Brandeis dissenting)).
179. Id. at 2622 (Marshall dissenting) (stating that "[t]he majority cannot seriously claim
that any of these traditional bases for overruling a precedent applies to Booth or Gathers").
180. Id. at 2625 (Marshall dissenting). Marshall concluded his opinion:
Today's decision charts an unmistakable course. If the majority's radical reconstruction of the
rules for overturning this Court's decisions is to be taken at face value-and the majority
offers us no reason why it should not-then the overruling of Booth and Gathers is but a
preview of an even broader and more far-reaching assault upon this Court's precedents. Cast
aside today are those condemned to face society's ultimate penalty. Tomorrow's victims may
be minorities, women, or the indigent. Inevitably, this campaign to resurrect yesterday's
"spirited dissents" will squander the authority and legitimacy of this Court as a protector of
the powerless.
Id. (Marshall dissenting).
181. See notes 184-98 and accompanying text.
182. See note 199 and accompanying text.
183. See notes 202-06 and accompanying text.
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members of his victim concerning the family's view on the appropriate
sentence to be imposed.184 In that case, a jury had convicted Olan Robi-
son of a triple murder and had sentenced him to death.185 At sentenc-
ing, Robison had attempted to introduce testimony of a sister of one of
the victims. Robison claims the sister would have testified that he
should not receive the death penalty. 8"
The Supreme Court refused to hear Robison's post-Payne appeal.
At first glance, the Court appears to have applied a double standard in
allowing victim impact evidence offered by the prosecution but not that
offered by the defendant.1 87 While this denial of appeal appears to be
another blow to the rights of defendants, after further examination the
Court's decision in Robison may signal the Court's willingness to bar a
specific type of victim impact evidence. The type of evidence the courts
barred in Robison was the type not considered in Payne: the victim's
family's characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant,
and the appropriate sentence. 88
In deciding Robison, the federal appellate court would not allow
the defendant to admit opinion testimony because a consequence would
be to allow the prosecution to offer testimony that the court should im-
pose the death penalty, thereby reducing the sentencing hearing to a
"contest of irrelevant opinions."'8 9 The Tenth Circuit found that this
type of opinion testimony did not apply to either the character or rec-
ord of the defendant, nor to any of the circumstances of the crime.9 0 It
further held that such testimony would confuse the jury and divert its
184. Robison v. Maynard, 112 S. Ct. 445 (1991). See also Linda Greenhouse, Justices Won't
Hear Inmates Plea to Let Relative of Victim Testify, N.Y. Times at Bl (Nov. 19, 1991).
185. Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1503 (10th Cir. 1987).
186. Greenhouse, N.Y. Times at Bl (cited in note 184). Robison contended, through coun-
sel, that he intended to call relatives of the victims who had expressed a "desire to ask the jury not
to impose the death penalty in this case." Robison, 829 F.2d at 1504.
187. The Court offered no rationale in denying Robison's appeal. Moreover, this decision by
the Court may be in conflict with the holdings in previous capital cases requiring the admission of
all mitigating evidence. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586 (1978). See also text accompanying note 81. The defendant argued before the Tenth Circuit
that the victim's family's testimony would present proper mitigating factors that the jury need
consider. Robison, 829 F.2d at 1504. Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit, in hearing Robison's appeal
after Payne was handed down, found that while Payne gave the prosecutors the ability to use
victim impact evidence, it gave no such corresponding right to the defendants. See Greenhouse,
N.Y. Times at Bll. The Tenth Circuit ruled that the testimony of the victim's sister "in no way
constitutes relevant evidence because it does not relate to the harm caused by the defendant." Id.
Interestingly, the Oklahoma Attorney General's office urged the Supreme Court not to hear
the appeal because "[t]he retributive function of the criminal law exists on behalf of society as
embodied in the state, not on behalf of the victim's family." Id.
188. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2. The Court held this type of evidence to be violative of the
Eighth Amendment in Booth, 482 U.S. at 508-09.
189. Robison, 829 F.2d at 1504.
190. Id. at 1504-05.
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attention from its most important task: the decision whether to impose
the death penalty. 9' The Tenth Circuit contended that opinion testi-
mony concerning the appropriate sentence also would interfere with the
jury's ability to perform its duty to act as the conscience of the commu-
nity.192 Hence, in Robison, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to
clarify the Payne decision and uphold that part of Booth which barred
the admission of such evidence; however, it failed to do so.
The Court also had opportunity to comment on Payne when it
overturned the death sentence of a prison escapee whom a jury had
convicted of murder. 193 In Dawson v. Delaware, the Court found that
the prosecution violated the defendant's First Amendment rights by in-
forming the jury at sentencing that the defendant was a member of a
white racist prison gang called the Aryan Brotherhood. 9 4 The defend-
ant had presented mitigating evidence through the testimony of the de-
fendant's family members at sentencing by introducing the fact that
the defendant earned good time credits in prison and had enrolled in
several drug and alcohol rehabilitation programs."'
The Court narrowly tailored its holding in Dawson to fit the spe-
cific facts of the case, i.e., where the evidence offered by the state only
concerned abstract beliefs. The Court also held that as the defendant
has the right to present all relevant mitigating evidence, the prosecu-
tion is entitled to rebut that evidence with its own evidence.' 98 Thus,
the prosecutor argued that because Dawson offered evidence concerning
his good character, the prosecution should allow it to introduce evi-
dence of his bad character.' 97 The Court agreed with this general argu-
191. Id. at 1505 (declaring that "[s]uch testimony, at best, would be a go samer veil which
would blur the jury's focus on the issue it must decide").
192. Id.
193. Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct. 1093 (1992). See Linda Greenhouse, Unusual Use of
First Amendment Overturns a Killer's Death Sentence, N.Y. Times at A14 (March 10, 1992).
194. The Supreme Court has held that an individual has the right to join groups and associ-
ate with others who share similar beliefs. See N.A.A.C.P. v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460 (1958). The Court also has held that a jury cannot consider, as an aggravating circum-
stance, and draw negative inferences from, this constitutionally protected activity. See Zant v.
Stevens, 462 U.S. 862, 885 (1983). The Court in Dawson found that "the receipt into evidence of
the stipulation regarding his membership in the Aryan Brotherhood was constitutional error" be-
cause it "proved nothing more than Dawson's abstract beliefs." Dawson v. Delaware, 112 S. Ct.
1093, 1097-98 (1992). The prosecution initially intended to introduce into evidence expert testi-
mony concerning the nature of the Aryan Brotherhood, that Dawson had the words "Aryan Broth-
erhood" tattooed on the back of his hand, and that Dawson had multiple swastika tattoos on his
back and a picture of a swastika painted in his jail cell. Id. at 1095-96. The prosecution and de-
fendant later agreed to a stipulation which simply stated that Dawson belonged to the Aryan
Brotherhood, a racist prison gang. Id. at 1096.
195. 112 S. Ct. at 1096.
196. Id. at 1098-99.
197. Id. at 1099.
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ment, but found fault in the specific evidence that the prosecution
offered because it was not relevant in its own right.198 As a result, while
the Court reversed Dawson's death sentence, it seemingly expanded the
holding in Payne. The Court stated in dicta that Payne stood for more
than the proposition that the state could offer victim impact evidence
to counteract the defendant's mitigating evidence. The Court also
carved out a new area of evidence that is admissible by the state at
capital sentencing hearings: evidence of the defendant's bad character.
B. State Courts 'After Payne
Many state courts also have had the opportunity to apply Payne in
analyzing the admissibility of victim impact evidence. Almost every
state court that has had this opportunity has invoked Payne to uphold
the admission of victim impact evidence.199 Most state courts simply
have held that because Payne overruled Booth and Gathers, defend-
ants' arguments against admitting victim impact evidence were inva-
lid. 00 Moreover, at least one state court has taken the analysis one step
further and found that the admission of victim impact evidence not
only is admissible under Payne, but also is admissible under their state
constitution.0 1
On the other hand, despite the Court's decision in Payne, New
Jersey courts have found that their state constitution's principles of due
process, reasonable punishments, and independent precepts of funda-
mental fairness forbid victim impact evidence at capital sentencing pro-
ceedings. 02 Following Booth, the Supreme Court of New Jersey had
198. The Court reasoned that it was not relevant because the evidence only concerned ab-
stract beliefs, which are protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 1098-99.
199. At least 13 states have allowed victim impact evidence at capital sentencing since
Payne. See Smith v. State, 588 So.2d 561, 572 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); People v. Edwards, 819
P.2d 436 (Cal. 1991); In re Petition of the State of Delaware for a Writ of Mandamus, 597 A.2d 1,
1 (Del. 1991) (issuing a writ directing a Delaware Superior Court in the case of State v. Harris,
1991 Del. Super. LEXIS *331, to accept victim impact evidence); Hodges v. State, 595 S.2d 929,
933 (Fla. 1992); Todd v. State, 410 S.E.2d 725, 729-30 (Ga. 1991); Idaho v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081,
1089 (Idaho 1991); People v. Howard, 147 Ill.2d 103, 588 N.E.2d 1044, 1066-67 (1991); Benirschke
v. State, 577 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Ind. 1991); Wiggins v. State, 324 Md. 551, 597 A.2d 1359, 1373 (Md.
1991) (in dicta); State v. Williams, 480 N.W.2d 390, 390 (Neb. 1992); Homick v. Nevada, 825 P.2d
600, 605-06 (Nev. 1992); State v. Chinn, 1991 Ohio App. LEXIS 6497, *47-48; State v. Johnson,
410 S.E.2d. 547, 555 (S.C. 1991).
200. See, for example, People v. Pinholster, 824 P.2d 571, 620 (Cal. 1992); Todd v. State, 410
S.E.2d at 729-30.
201. People v. Howard, 508 N.E.2d 1044, 1067 (Ill. 1991) (holding that "[w]hile we do not
intend to suggest the victim impact evidence will be relevant at the guilt-innocence phase of a
capital trial, we do not believe that anything in the Illinois Constitution automatically forbids its
introduction at a capital sentencing hearing").
202. State v. Erazo, 594 A.2d 232, 258 (N.J. 1991) (Handler concurring in part, dissenting in
part) Judge Handler dissented by arguing that capital punishment is unconstitutional altogether.
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applied a strict standard to the determination of the admissibility of
victim impact evidence.08 The New Jersey Supreme Court had found
that even though state law allowed for victim impact statements in cap-
ital trials, the state constitution required that juries consider whether
to impose the death penalty only if they had not been unnecessarily
exposed to prejudicial or inflammatory commentary.0 Subsequently,
New Jersey courts relied on this precedent rather than on Booth and
Gathers,0 5 since the New Jersey Supreme Court had held that the state
constitution afforded greater protections against the admissibility of
victim impact evidence than does the U.S. Constitution.0
In contrast, one state court has gone' beyond the holding in Payne
and found that the admission of victim impact evidence pertaining to
the family member's view on the appropriate sentence is not error.07 In
Idaho v. Card,08 a presentence investigator, pursuant to state law, pre-
pared a presentence report prior to sentencing. 0 9 Part of that report
included interviews with members of the victim's family.2 10 One state-
ment by a family member professed that it "was the consensus of the
family that Card should be sentenced to death for his crime."211 Card
challenged the admissibility of this statement, arguing that allowing
such testimony violated Booth. The Idaho Supreme Court stated that
while Payne overruled part of Booth, it did not consider the issue of the
admission of the family members' opinions concerning the sentence.212
203. State v. Williams, 550 A.2d 1172, 1202-06 (N.J. 1988).
204. Erazo, 594 A.2d at 258.
205. See, for example, State v. Harvey, 581 A.2d 483, 491-92 (N.J. 1990); State v. Clausell,
580 A.2d 221, 243-44 (N.J. 1990).
206. Erazo, 594 A.2d at 259 (Handler concurring in part, dissenting in part). The New Jersey
Supreme Court pointed out that, as mandated by Booth, New Jersey prohibited the introduction
of victim impact evidence at the guilt phase of capital trials as well as at the sentencing phase. See
Williams, 550 A.2d at 1203.
207. Idaho v. Card, 825 P.2d 1081, 1089 (Idaho 1991) (holding that "the victim impact state-
ments contained in the presentence report, including the comments contained in the report as to
an appropriate sentence, are not error and do not require that the case be remanded for
resentencing").
208. Id.
209. See Idaho Crim. Rule 33.1 (providing for the preparation of a presentence report to be
used in sentencing).
210. Card, 825 P.2d at 1087-88.
211. Id. The report also contained the family's description of their family as "very closely
knit," and the family's claim that the victims "were poor but they would give whatever they had to
help others." Further, the report stated that the family's opinion was that if Card "could shoot to
death two total strangers with no provocation whatsoever, he could do it again just as easily." Id.
at 1087 n.7.
212. The Idaho Supreme Court used Card to hold that Payne overruled a line of Idaho cases
which held that victim impact statements were barred due to Booth. Id. at 1088 (overruling State
v. Pizzuto, 810 P.2d 680 (Idaho 1991); State v. Paz, 798 P.2d 1 (Idaho 1990); and State V.
Charboneau, 774 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1989)).
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The Idaho Supreme Court then determined that the sentencing judge
did not rely on the family members' opinion in making the sentencing
decision; therefore, it allowed the evidence.21 s Hence, the Idaho Su-
preme Court found that admitting evidence which violated that portion
of the holding in Booth which Payne did not overturn was not an error.
This case very easily could be the instrument by which the U.S. Su-
preme Court will clarify its holding in Payne regarding how much of
Booth is overruled and how much, if any, of Booth still is good law.214
V. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PAYNE. WHY THE COURT SHOULD NOT
HAVE ALLOWED THE ADMISSION OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE
The rise of the victims' rights movement underscores the move-
ment in America toward refusing to acknowledge the social causes of
crime and placing the responsibility for crime control on the courts.2"5
This movement toward securing rights for victims, however, is ox-
ymoronic. The use of the term rights2 6 connotes oppression and the
deprivation of entitlements, power, equality, or liberty.21 7 But to give
victims an undefined and irreducible right is to trump the rights of de-
fendants.21 ' In so doing, courts neglect the traditional concern of the
criminal justice system, protecting those individual rights that restrain
the state from acting against an individual.219
The Payne Court approved the use of evidence that will not fur-
ther the societal goals of sentencing. It opened the door for the admis-
sion of victim opinion testimony concerning the appropriate sentence to
be imposed on defendants. The Court also stepped backward from the
idea of ensuring like sentences for similarly situated defendants. 20
213. The Idaho Supreme Court said, "We have carefully reviewed the entire record and are
satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the sentencing judge imposed the death penalty in this
case based on the evidence and without regard to the opinions of the Morey family and the state-
ments contained in the presentence investigation report regarding the nature of the sentence."
Card, 825 P.2d at 1089.
214. The Idaho Supreme Court decision in Card has been appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court. Petition for certiorari was filed on May 28, 1992.
215. See Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 946-47 (cited in note 7).
216. Examples include civil rights, gay rights, women's rights, right to choose, or right to life.
217. See Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 952.
218. Id. The movement toward the abolition of the exclusionary rule from Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence is an example where victims' rights are being used to justify the abolition of
defendants' rights. Id. at 982-86.
219. Dina R. Hellerstein, The Victim Impact Statement: Reform or Reprisal?, 27 Am. Crim.
L. Rev. 391, 395 (1989).
220. The Court bluntly and unapologetically overturned recent precedent thereby opening
the dam for a flood of overrulings which appears to be on the horizon. A critical analysis of Payne
would be incomplete without mention of the Court's glaring failure to adhere to the doctrine of
stare decisis. This Note could not, and will not, address this totally distinct jurisprudential ques-
tion fully or completely.
1992] 1649
1650 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1621
A. Victim Participation Does Not Further the Goals of Sentencing
What goals does society seek in imposing sentencing? If victim par-
ticipation in sentencing does not further societal goals, and if another
justification is not offered, then the legal system should bar such partic-
ipation. Thus, analyzing sentencing goals in death cases is especially
important.22 '
The justifications for the punishment of criminals fall into four cat-
egories: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.222
Stare decisis is the doctrine under which "decisions made today become the guide and prece-
dent by which future similar cases will be governed." Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle for Judicial
Supremacy at 295 (Octagon Books, 1979). Stare decisis also is the doctrine by which the present
Court adheres to the decisions previously handed down. Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and
Tradition, 99 Yale L. J. 1029, 1032 (1990). At common law, stare decisis ensures the stability of
and maintains the rule of law. Note, Constitutional Stare Decisis, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1344, 1345
(1990). Further, stare decisis is embodied in constitutional law by the respect of precedent and
adherence to past decisions. Id.
Stare decisis is the preferred path for the Court, because the Court, as a legal institution, is a
unique political actor that should make its decisions through the application of reasoned legal
principles, not through an adherence to partisan politics. Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme
Court in Transition: Assessing the Legitimacy of the Leading Legal Institution, 79 Ky. L. J. 317,
319-20 (1990-91). Without stare decisis, case decisions would be arbitrary and unpredictable. Stare
decisis therfore is necessary for the judiciary to retain its legitimacy within the American constitu-
tional, political system.
While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the Court "has never departed from prece-
dent without 'special justification.'" Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2621 (Marshall dissenting) (quoting Ari-
zona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984)). The Court has defined three special justifications: (1)
the need to resolve conflicting precedents; (2) the finding that the conditions upon which the first
decision were premised have changed; and (3) the finding that a previous decision has proved
unworkable. See Note, 103 Harv. L. Rev. at 1346. The Payne majority did not suggest that the
precedents were in conflict, nor that the conditions upon which Booth and Gathers had been de-
cided had changed in the few years since they were decided. Payne, 111 S. Ct. at 2622 (Marshall
dissenting). The majority feebly attempted to argue that the precedents were unworkable by iden-
tifying dissents in prior decisions and one state court decision, State v. Huertas. See notes 271-76
and accompanying text. In short, the Payne majority could not offer a special justification for
failing to adhere to stare decisis. The only circumstance that had changed since Booth and Gathers
was the composition of the Court.
The Court attempted to justify its failure to adhere to precedent by arguing that stare decisis
is only necessary in cases involving reliance interests and property and contract rights. Payne, 111
S. Ct. at 2610. But by such emphasis, the Court has "[sent] a clear signal that essentially all
decisions implementing the personal liberties protected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment are open to reexamination." Id. at 2623.
221. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976) (stating that "death is a pun-
ishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree").
222. See Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 987-99 (cited in note 7); Talbert, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev.
at 211-19 (cited in note 30). Some commentors divide the justifications into two categories: retribu-
tive goals and utilitarian goals. Murphy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1306 (cited in note 31). These com-
mentators place deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation in the utilitarian category because
they all serve to increase the total happiness of society. Id. at 1309-14.
However, rehabilitation and incapacitation also can be subunits of deterrence because the ob-
ject of incapacitation is to prevent the offender from offending again, and the object of rehabilita-
tion is to deter crime by modifying the offender's behavior so the offender will not offend again.
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These goals do not apply equally in all cases, nor does any one always
take precedence over the others. Rather, each goal serves a different
role, in a differing magnitude, at each sentencing decision.2 s
The basic premise driving retribution is the belief that a judge or
jury should impose punishment according to moral blameworthiness.
2 4
One can view retribution from the perspective of society or from the
perspective of the individual. From society's perspective, the goal of
retribution is to inflict punishment on the defendant for his disregard
of society's rules. From the victim's perspective, the purpose of retribu-
tion _s vengeance. 225 In contrast to the other goals of sentencing, socie-
tal retribution focuses on the defendant, and not on society's needs.226
The goal of proportionate sentencing is at the center of retribution.2 27
Originally, commentators perceived proportionate sentencing as a prin-
ciple of equality: one who murders violates a fundamental societal rule,
and death is equal punishment.228 In practice today, the retribution
theory demands that a just punishment be proportionate to the harm
the criminal intended. 2 ' The death penalty represents the ultimate so-
ciety could seek as retribution.
Since retribution is a goal to be met in imposing an appropriate
sentence, the sentencing agent must evaluate the defendant's moral
blameworthiness. In so doing, the sentencing agent must evaluate the
morality of the defendant's activity against some baseline. The sentenc-
ing agent should compare the defendant's blameworthiness against soci-
The overlap between the utilitarian category and the retributive category is enough to blur the
distinction. Therefore, this Note will use the four categories of deterrence, rehabilitation, incapaci-
tation, and retribution. Congress also identified these as the four classic purposes of sentencing in
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat.
1987 (1984), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) (Supp. 1991).
223. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 987 (cited in note 7).
224. See id. at 990-99; Murphy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1306-09. Immanuel Kant first proposed
the moral basis of retribution and opposed treating an individual as a means towards achieving a
social end. See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law (W. Hastie translation, 1887), reprinted in
Sanford H. Kadish and Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes at 137-38 (Little,
Brown, 5th. ed. 1989).
225. Those who argue that two theories of punishment exist place vengeance in the utilita-
rian class because vengeance refers to punishment based on consequences; therefore, they argue
that any consideration of the victim would be irrelevant to the retribution sentencing calculus.
Murphy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1308 (cited in note 31).
226. Id. at 1306-07. Some, however, find that vengeance also is part of the retributive theory
and that society has a right to retaliate against those who fail to follow society's rules. See Hender-
son, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 991.
227. Murphy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1307. For a discussion on how victim participation at
sentencing is adverse to proportional sentencing see Part V.C.
228. Murphy, 55 U. Chi. L. Rev. at 1307. However, "[t]here are obvious problems with this
definition. Few would suggest, for example, that rape is the appropriate punishment for rape." Id.
229. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 990-92. The proportionality principle is "a correspon-
dence between the wickedness of the act and the suffering to be inflicted upon the actor." Id.
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ety's blameworthiness, 230 not against the victim's blameworthiness,
since the criminal acted against society and since society accuses, tries,
and punishes the defendant.2"' If the criminal justice system allows the
victim to have a voice at sentencing or allows the admission of the vic-
tim's characteristics, it invites the sentencing agent to question the vic-
tim's relative blameworthiness, thereby shifting the focus away from
the individual defendant and away from the crime against society. 32
Victim participation at sentencing is adverse to the victim's inter-
ests under a retribution model. A victim would be offended if her moral
standing were at issue as a defense for the crime or as a factor to con-
sider in imposing a lenient sentence. For example, in Texas, before im-
posing a sentence upon a man convicted of murdering two men, one
judge considered the characteristics of the victims and refused to im-
pose a life sentence..2 3 The judge's reason for refusing to impose a stiff
sentence was that the victims were homosexuals.2 34 Howiver, the judge
did not restrict his disdain to homosexuals; he also stated that he would
not sentence a murderer to life imprisonment for killing a prostitute.235
Moreover, any focus on the victim's characteristics or moral standing at
the sentencing stage would frustrate the goal of the victims' rights
movement in helping the victim or her family regain the self-control
lost through victimization. If the sentencing agent scrutinized or criti-
cized the victim's moral standing then the victim's family would feel
victimized again on the witness stand.23 6
Despite its popularity among victims' rights proponents, the second
form of retribution, vengeance,2 37 has received little support from social
230. The sentencing agent should compare society's goodness with the defendant's badness.
Talbert, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 212 (cited in note 30).
231. A criminal action is different than a civil action in which a victim brings suit on her own
behalf. The theory of the criminal action is that the defendant's act was damaging to society, and
society should punish the defendant. The theory of a civil action is that one individual has harmed
another individual, to whom he should pay restitution.
232. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 991-92 (cited in note 7). At times, the criminal justice
system does shift the blame for a crime to the-victim. For example, when a defendant asserts self-
defense, the actions of the victim are considered. Id.
233. Lisa Belkin, Texas Judge Eases Sentence for Killer of Two Homosexuals, N.Y. Times
A8 (Dec. 17, 1988).
234. Id. Judge Hampton said: "Those two gays that got killed wouldn't have been killed if
they hadn't been cruising the streets picking up teen-age boys. I don't much care for queers cruis-
ing the streets picking up teen-age boys. I've got a teen-age boy." Judge is Censured Over Remark
on Homosexuals, N.Y. Times at A28 (Nov. 29, 1989).
235. See Belkin, N.Y. Times at AS. Judge Hampton declared: "I put prostitutes and gays at
about the same level and I'd be hard put to give somebody life for killing a prostitute." Id.
236. Talbert, 36 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 213. The experience would be similar to that which a
rape victim undergoes when defense attorneys raise her prior sexual history as a defense for the
defendant's actions. See generally Peter M. Hazelton, Note, Rape Shield Laws: Limits on Zealous
Advocacy, 19 Am. J. Crim. L. 35 (1991).
237. Those who use vengeance as justification for victim participation at sentencing do so by
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scientists or philosophers.3 8 Vengeance and anger are intertwined, and
while victims' anger at the criminal who victimized them is justifiable,
vengeance as a manifestation of that anger has a questionable psycho-
logical value to the victim. 239 The victim's desire for vengeance also con-
flicts with the goal of equal and proportionate sentencing.2 40 Vengeance
is a dangerous rationale for allowing victim participation at sentencing
since such testimony often is emotional, uncontrollable by the prosecu-
tor or judge, and extremely prejudicial. A recent sentencing hearing
that received enormous attention highlights this point. At the sentenc-
ing of convicted serial murderer Jeffrey Dahmer, the sister of one vic-
tim exclaimed toward Dahmer, "You are the devil that walked on the
streets and was loose." The brother of another victim told Dahmer, "I
hope you go to hell. '24 1 But another victim's sister produced the most
emotional reaction when she called Dahmer "Satan" and shouted, "I
hate you," along with other obscenities. Deputies had to restrain her as
she moved toward the defendant.242
The second goal in sentencing is deterrence.243 Deterrence can be
classified as general deterrence and specific deterrence.2 " General de-
terrence deters potential lawbreakers by punishing specific actions and
giving warning to potential wrongdoers that such actions will be pun-
ished.245 Specific deterrence deters the criminal himself from further
arguing that victim participation "prevents mob violence, channels society's outrage, and preserves
the legitimacy of the criminal justice system by paying heed to the community's sense of justice."
None of these rationales support retaliation from a utilitarian perspective because the likelihood of
mob violence is remote at best, crime does not provoke strangers to retaliate against defendants,
and victim participation is not an appropriate channel for society's outrage. Henderson, 37 Stan. L.
Rev. at 995 (cited in note 7). Victim participation actually may be counterproductive to evoking
society's outrage because the sentencing agent will hear the vicim's outrage, and not that of soci-
ety. One of the prosecutor's jobs is to communicate effectively society's outrage. See Karyn Ellen
Polito, The Rights of Crime Victims in the Criminal Justice System: Is Justice Blind to the
Victims of Crime?, 16 New England J. on Crim. and Civil Confinement 241, 252 (1990).
238. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 994 (cited in note 7).
239. Id. at 996. "Emphasizing individual vengeance and blame can undermine, rather than
facilitate, recovery from a violent crime. . .[and] even a harsh sentence does not end the matter
for the victim." Id. at 998.
240. Id. at 996. Disproportionate sentencing is discussed further in Part V.C.
241. See Rogers Worthington, Dahmer Says He's Sorry, Gets 15 Life Terms, Chi. Trib. 3
(Feb. 18, 1992).
242. Id. While Dahmer was not in jeopardy of receiving a death sentence, these types of
outbursts could easily occur at capital sentencing hearings.
243. Jeremy Bentham probably is the best known proponent of the theory that punishment
is an evil in and of itself and only is justifiable if it serves the greater social good of preventing a
greater evil. Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill, eds., The Utilitarians at 162, 166 (Dolphin Books, 1961)
reprinted in Kadish and Schulhofer, Criminal Law at 139-40 (cited in note 224).
244. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 987.
245. Id. at 987-89.
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wrongdoing.246 The deterrence theory is central to the death penalty
debate. Those in favor of the death penalty most often use the theory
of deterrence as support, while opponents of the death penalty argue
that the death penalty is not an effective deterrent.247
The deterrence theory does not justify victim participation in capi-
tal proceedings. The general deterrence theory rests on the notion that
the legal system will prevent future crime if severe and certain
sentences are imposed on criminals.248 While victim participation may
have an effect on the severity of a sentence, it will have an adverse
effect on the certainty of sentences.2 49 Commentators also question the
impact of victiin impact statements on the severity of sentences. 250
They argue that victim input evidence does little more than repeat in-
formation already known to the court and jury and already accounted
for in the indictment and trial.5 1 Moreover, deterrence is effective only
when the party being deterred is aware of the factors that the sentenc-
ing agent will consider.252 Allowing the admission into evidence of the
victim's characteristics, of which the defendant was unaware, will do
little to deter future criminals.25 Furthermore, proponents of the death
penalty have not proved that it is an effective deterrent of capita]
crimes.25 4
Specific deterrence also is not a valid justification for victim partic-
ipation at sentencing, especially in capital cases. It is difficult to see
246. Id. "General deterrence seeks to educate others; specific deterrence seeks to educate the
individual offender." Id. at 988.
247. See Kadish and Schulhofer, Criminal Law at 548-52 (cited in note 224).
248. Id.
249. See Part V.C. Moreover, criminals who know that the moral blameworthiness of the
victim may be fair game at sentencing may not be deterred from victimizing those citizens who
have questionable moral backgrounds. A gay basher in Texas will not be deterred from criminal
activity if Judge Hampton considers the victim's characteristics at sentencing. See text accompa-
nying notes 233-35.
250. See Hall, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 246-47 (cited in note 29).
251. Id. at 247. A survey of judges showed that they believed that the least useful type of
information conveyed in the victim impact statement was the victim's opinion as to the sentence
that should be imposed. Id. at 246.
252. If a potential criminal has no idea that robbing a bank is a bad act and punishable, then
the stiffest penalties for past bank robbers will do little to deter the potential bank robber.
253. Even if all potential murderers knew that if they killed a religious man who carried a
Bible and a voting registration card they would recieve the death penalty, that fact would not
deter them unless they knew that their potential victim shared those characteristics.
254. "Anyone who carefully examines the. . .data is bound to arrive at the conclusion that
the death penalty, as we use it, exercises no influence on the extent or fluctuating rates of capital
crimes. It has failed as a deterrent. If it has a utilitarian value, it must rest in some other attribute
than its power to influence the future conduct of people." Thorsten Sellin, The Death Penalty: A
Report for the Model Penal Code Project of the American Law Institute at 63 (1959), reprinted in
Kadish and Schulhofer, Criminal Law at 549. See also Richard 0. Lempert, Deterrence and De-




how sentencing a defendant based upon factors of which he was una-
ware during the commission of the first crime would deter him from
committing a second crime. A person cannot be deterred by unknown
factors. Secondly, a defendant who is on death row awaiting the death
penalty will have little incentive not to commit murder while in prison,
since he is facing the ultimate penalty already.
255
Another goal of sentencing is incapacitation, removing individuals
from society so that they are unable to commit future offenses. The goal
of incapacitation as a form of punishment is justified by reasoning that
a particular defendant is a threat to society and must be separated from
law-abiding citizens. Under this reasoning, the only determination nec-
essary is the future dangerousness of the defendant, and neither the
characteristics of the victim nor the testimony of the victim are relevant
to that determination. 256 Admittedly, the manner in which a crime
takes place 57 is an important factor in determining the amount of inca-
pacitation that is necessary to protect society from a defendant; how-
ever, victim participation is not the only means available to convey the
manner in which the crime occurred. The death penalty is the ultimate
incapacitation because once inflicted the defendant no longer can com-
mit crimes. However, life imprisonment without parole 5 8 can be as ef-
fective as is capital punishment.
259
The final goal for punishment, rehabilitation, has not received
widespread support.26 0 However, rehabilitation must be a factor that is
considered in sentencing unless all defendants are to be incapacitated
255. An opposing analysis also could be offered as follows: the specific deterrent is effective
because once the sentence is carried out, the individual defendant forever will be prevented from
committing a crime. See Robert Bartels, Capital Punishment: The Unexamined Issue of Special
Deterrence, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 601 (1983). However, this view actually is one of incapacitation, not
deterrence, because deterrence assumes that the individual is capable of acting and yet is deterred
by some inward force. See Dwight L. Greene, Foreward, Drug Decriminalization: A Chorus in
Need of Masterrap's Voice, 18 Hofstra L. Rev. 457, 462 n.9 (1990) (stating that deterrence theories
assume the existence of rational decisionmakers). See generally Kenneth G. Daw Schmidt, An Eco-
nomic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 Duke L. J. 1.
256. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 989-90 (cited in note 7).
257. The heinousness or viciousness of a crime certainly is a factor to be considered in deter-
mining the amount of incapacitation, as is a showing that the defendant demonstrated a complete
disregard for human life. See People v. Benkowski, 575 N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991); State
v. Walton, 769 P.2d 1017, 1032-34 (Ariz. 1989).
258. See Julian H. Wright, Jr., Life Without Parole: The View from Death Row, 27 Crim. L.
Bull. 334 (1991).
259. If the sentencing agent determines that a defendant may be a threat in prison as well as
while free in society, then the prison officials should be free to separate that defendant from the
rest of the prison population. The death penalty is not the appropriate response to a failed prison
system; rather the prison system should be improved.
260. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 990. Congress stated in the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 that "imprisonment is not an appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation."
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (1984).
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for life or put to death.261 Rehabilitation, like incapacitation, is defend-
ant-based. In other words, the defendant's sentence depends on the
likelihood of society's success in rehabilitating him. Rehabilitation also
is defendant-oriented, not victim-oriented, because in determining how
to rehabilitate the defendant, any matters concerning the victim are ir-
relevant.2 62 But rehabilitation is impossible once the death penalty has
been carried out; therefore rehabilitation cannot be a goal in capital
sentencing.
Of the four goals of sentencing in criminal law, only retribution and
deterrence can be used to justify the death penalty. Yet neither victim
participation at sentencing nor the admission of evidence concerning
the characteristics of the victim further these goals, as the level of harm
that a victim's family suffers is irrelevant to the capital sentencing
decision.2
6 3
B. The Payne Court Left Open the Possibility that Victims'
Opinions as to Appropriate Punishment May Be Admitted During
Capital Sentencing
The decision of the Idaho Supreme Court in Idaho v. Card26 high-
lights the Payne Court's omission of failing to explicitly reaffirm those
portions of Booth that were not at issue in Payne. 65 The Payne Court
provided state courts with the opportunity to allow the introduction
261. If society does not believe that criminals can be rehabilitated, society will have to im-
prison all criminals for life or put all criminals to death in order to protect itself from the
criminals' future actions.
One reason that the goal of rehabilitation generally has been overlooked is that some view
rehabilitation as a part of deterrence that focuses on the individual criminal. For instance, if the
threat of a one month jail term is sufficient to deter a shoplifter from ever shoplifting again, then
that sentence has effectively rehabilitated the criminal through deterrence. However, some
criminals, such as sex offenders, can be rehabilitated only through counselling, and the longest
prison terms will not deter them from future sex crimes. See Leonore H. Tavill, Note, Scarlet
Letter Punishment: Yesterday's Outlawed Penalty is Today's Probation Condition, 36 Clev. St. L.
Rev. 613, 638 (1988).
262. The only time a victim statement may be helpful in considering a defendant's rehabili-
tation is when the victim has specific information that concerns the defendant's likelihood for
rehabilitation. Henderson, 37 Stan. L. Rev. at 990 (cited in note 7). However, even if the victim has
such knowledge, some other source probably could provide such information to the sentencing
agent. Id.
263. "In a criminal case, particularly in a capital criminal case, the harm to family members
and community is not relevant in determining the punishment." Jump, 21 Ga. L. Rev. at 1210
(cited in note 125).
264. 825 P.2d 1081 (Idaho 1991). See text accompanying notes 207-14 (discussion of Idaho v.
Card).
265. The victim impact evidence in Payne related only to the characteristics of the victim
and to the impact of the victim's death on the family. The admission of the family members'
opinions concerning the crime or the appropriate sentence to be imposed were not at issue. Payne,
111 S. Ct. at 2611 n.2.
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into evidence of the victim's family members' opinions of the sentence
that the sentencing agent should impose. Such evidence should not be
allowed at any sentencing hearing, especially not at a capital sentencing
hearing.
2 66
From a legal standpoint, victim opinion testimony is the weakest
form of victim impact evidence, and its connection to the effects of a
crime is tenuous at best.2 67 According to Supreme Court jurisprudence,
a decision to impose the death penalty must be, and must appear to be,
based on reason rather than caprice or emotion.2 8 In Card, the Idaho
Supreme Court failed to adhere to the Booth Court's admonition that
the decision must be clean of any taint or the appearance of such. Al-
though the Idaho Supreme Court thoroughly examined the record
before determining that the sentencing judge imposed the sentence
based on evidence distinct from the victim's family members' opin-
ions, 69 it failed to address the issue that the admission of the evidence
itself created an appearance that the sentencing agent imposed the
death penalty based upon emotion or caprice.
In a case decided prior to Payne, the Supreme Court of Ohio held
that admitting into evidence the opinion of a witness as to the appro-
priateness of a particular sentence is unconstitutional.2 70 A jury had
convicted the defendant of killing a friend, and it sentenced him to
death. 1  Pursuant to Ohio law, the defendant had requested a
presentence report prior to sentencing. 72 The report had included a
statement by the victim's father expressing the opinion that the de-
266. One commentator has noted: "Victim participation statutes calling for the victim's opin-
ion or recommendation as to the case disposition are ill-conceived measures triggering far more
harmful consequences than their meager benefits." Hall, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 266 (cited in note
29). For examples of state laws allowing such evidence, see Ky. Rev. Ann. Stat. § 421.520 (1992);
N.Y. Exec. Law § 647(1) (West Supp. 1992). See also Bruce J. Schulte, Victim Sentences Her
Attacker: Judge Lets 65-Year-Old Pick Rapist's Punishment, 75 A.B.A. J. 28 (April 1989).
267. Charlton T. Howard III, Note, Booth v. Maryland: Death Knell for the Victim Impact
Statement?, 47 Md. L. Rev. 701, 720 (1988).
268. 482 U.S. at 508 (quoting Gardner, 430 U.S. at 358). The Court in Booth commented:
One can understand the grief and anger of the family caused by the brutal murders in this
case, and there is no doubt that jurors are generally aware of these feelings. But the formal
presentation of this information by the State can serve no other purpose than to inflame the
jury and divert it from deciding the case on the relevant evidence concerning the crime and
the defendant.
Booth, 482 U.S. at 508.
269. See text accompanying note 207-14.
270. State v. Huertas, 553 N.E.2d 1058 (Ohio 1990), cert. granted, 111 S. Ct. 39 (1990). See
also Jeffrey D. Monzo, Note, State v. Huertas The Final Indignity: The Reluctance of Courts to
Allow Victim Impact Statements in Death Penalty Cases, 17 Ohio N. U. L. Rev. 211 (1990).
271. Huertas, 553 N.E. 2d at 1062. The jury convicted Huertas on one count of aggravated
murder with prior calculation and design, one count of aggravated murder in the course of commit-
ting aggravated burglary, and one count of aggravated burglary. Id.
272. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.03(D)(1) (Baldwin 1992).
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fendant should be sentenced to death.173 Further, the victim's father
had testified to that effect at the sentencing hearing.174 The Ohio Su-
preme Court held that the admission of the father's opinion concerning
the appropriateness of a sentence in a capital case is unconstitu-
tional.275 Indeed, as the Oklahoma Attorney General's office argued to
the U.S. Supreme Court in urging the Court to deny to hear the appeal
of Olan Robison, 78 the criminal justice system exists on behalf of the
state, not on behalf of the victim nor the victim's family. Sentencing
decisions should be based on the crime committed by the defendant,
not on the testimony of the victim's family.
C. Victim Impact Statements Will Lead to Disparate Treatment of
Similarly Situated Defendants
Victim participation at sentencing is unconstitutional because it
leads to disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants. While
identical sentences for different defendants convicted of the same crime
are not constitutionally compelled, 77 the Court consistently has held
that courts cannot mete out capital sentences arbitrarily or capri-
ciously.2 73 Indeed, the Court has taken extraordinary precautions to en-
sure that sentencing agents make the capital sentencing decision
without whim, passion, prejudice, or mistake . 7  The use of victim im-
pact statements and the admission of victim characteristics shifts the
focus of the sentencing agent away from the defendant as a unique,
individual human being. 80 In allowing such testimony, the Payne Court
blurred the distinction between capital and noncapital sentencing that
the Court previously had strived to maintain.2"' The Court no longer
requires sentencing agents to treat capital defendants as unique, indi-
273. Huertas, 553 N.E. 2d at 1062.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 1065. The Ohio Supreme Court found that the testimony violated the defendant's
right to have the sentencing decision made by the judge and jury. Id.
276. See note 187.
277. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 303 (1983) (Burger dissenting).
278. See text accompanying note 66.
279. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 118 (1982) (O'Connor concurring).
280. Booth, 482 U.S. at 504 (plurality opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens) (quoting
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304).
281. Some commentators have noted that the Court's rationale in Booth and Gathers also
blurred the distinction between capital and noncapital cases. Although the Court in Booth and
Gathers
was careful not to articulate its decisions in terms that would encompass non-capital cases,
the rationale of both cases would seem to apply equally convincingly to a non-capital case:
arbitrary sentencing practices, based upon the unpredictable 'victim participation' factor, are
objectionable in both capital and non-capital cases. There is no principle basis upon which an
'arbitrary and objectionable-arbitrary but acceptable' line can be drawn.
Hall, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 254 (cited in note 29).
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vidual human beings. Thus, the Court permits the sentencing agent to
consider factors that will lead to disparate sentences for similarly situ-
ated defendants.
Admittedly, sentencing agents never can impose sentences in such
a manner as to eliminate all disparities between like defendants.
282
Nonetheless, our justice system should seek to minimize disparate sen-
tencing of similarly situated defendants .28 3 The use of victim impact
evidence and the admissibility of victim characteristics potentially will
lead to disparate treatment of defendants based on such factors as the
wealth of the victim's family," 4 the ability of the victim's family to ar-
ticulate its feelings,28 5 and the jury's view of the victim's moral charac-
ter. Some states allow paid representatives to present victim impact
evidence on behalf of the victim's family.28 As a consequence, the fam-
ily of a wealthy victim may be able to purchase the services of a more
eloquent attorney to present their statement while a family of lesser
means could afford only a lesser attorney, or no attorney at all.287 The
victim's wealth should play no role in the sentencing decision of the
defendant.88
Further, even in cases in which the victim's family themselves de-
liver the victim impact statement, different families have different
levels of ability to articulate the harm caused by the crime.2 8 9 Also,
some victims do not have a family to make a statement. A defendant's
level of culpability should not depend on such fortuitous circumstances
as the composition of his victim's family, but rather on those circum-
stances over which he had control.9 °
282. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 517-518 (White dissenting). See also Hall, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
at 258 (stating that "[pirosecutors, defense lawyers, witnesses and others vary in ability and per-
suasiveness such that juries and sentencing authorities will respond accordingly, resulting in differ-
ing decisions for similar defendants").
283. Hall, 28 Am. Crim. L. Rev. at 258.
284. See id. at 259.
285. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 505.
286. See, for example, S.C. Code Ann. § 16-31530(f) (Law Co-op, 1985).
287. Admittedly, wealthy defendants can hire private attorneys to best represent their inter-
ests, but this situation is a necessary evil of the criminal justice system. See Hall, 28 Am. Crim. L.
Rev. at 259 n.138. The criminal justice system is designed to protect the defendant's rights, and
allowing the defendant to choose his own counsel is one of those rights. Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45, 53 (1932).
288. The evidence of the defendant's wealth may be admissible as a circumstance of the
crime. For instance, if the victim were killed pursuant to a robbery, the items stolen could be
entered into evidence and thus the jury may surmise the relative wealth of the victim.
289. The families of victims vary as to educational background, and more importantly, as to
proficiency in expression in English. Recent immigrants to America may have less command of the
language than more established families. The victim's family sometimes can testify at the guilt
phase of the trial, but the disparity is magnified when the family has free reign to testify as to
their grief and pain and is not directed by attorney questioning.
290. People v. Levitt, 156 Cal. App. 3d 500, 516 (1984). See Booth, 482 U.S. at 505 (stating
1992] 1659
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Perhaps the most egregious factor that sentencing agents may be
tempted to use in determining a sentence is the morality of the victim
as compared to the morality of the defendant. For example, when a
judge determines that the murderer of a homosexual deserves a more
lenient sentence than the murderer of a heterosexual, the sentence is
imposed based upon characteristics of the victims and justice is of-
fended.29' The life or death of a defendant should not depend on the
sexuality" 2 of the victim, nor on any other characteristic of the victim.
Such distinctions highlight the danger of allowing victim participation
in any form at capital sentencing.293
VI. CONCLUSION
Victims cannot be faulted for their feelings concerning the criminal
justice system or about the defendant. However, the proper response to
their feelings of frustration, pain, and dissatisfaction is not to give them
the opportunity to testify at the defendant's sentencing hearing.
Rather, the proper response is to adopt laws and procedures that will
assist victims in rebuilding their lives, coming to terms with the crime,
and healing emotionally. Hawaii has adopted a basic bill of rights for
victims that addresses the concerns of the victim while protecting the
constitutional rights of defendants.294 Hawaii informs the victim of the
major developments of the case, notifies her of delays, notifies her when
the defendant is released from custody, and consults and advises her
concerning plea bargaining by the state prosecutor.2 95 A victim coun-
selor also informs the victim about financial assistance and other social
services that are available. 296 Further, the state provides victims with
secure waiting areas, away from the defendant, the defendant's family,
and the defendant's friends,97 and the state expeditiously returns any
property that the victim lost.298
that "[t]he fact that the imposition of the death sentence may turn on such distinctions illustrates
the danger of allowing juries to consider this information").
291. See text accompanying notes 233-35.
292. It should also not depend on any other value judgement that the sentencing agent may
make depending on the victim input.
293. It is also true that distinctions should not be based upon the victim's standing in the
community, dealings with drugs or criminals, or other "moral" or value-laden characteristics of the
victim. See Booth, 482 U.S. at 506 (stating that "[n]or is there any justification for permitting such
a decision [to impose the death penalty] to turn on the perception that the victim was a sterling
member of the community rather than someone of questionable character").
294. See Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 801D-4 (Supp. 1991).
295. Id. § 801D-4(1).
296. Id. § 801D-4(4).
297. Id. § 801D-4(5).
298. Id. § 801D-4(6).
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VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENTS
While this Note argues that the Court wrongly decided Payne v.
Tennessee, the Court probably will not reverse that case in the foresee-
able future. Consequently, more states should follow Hawaii's example
and provide for the needs of victims without resorting to statutes that
allow the admission of victim impact statements at sentencing hearings.
However, the force of the powerful victims' rights movement, which
lobbied for the admission of victim impact evidence, will impede pro-
gress toward removing such statutes. After all, the movement was suc-
cessful in pushing forth such legislation and maintaining the status quo
in democratic politics always is easier than instigating change.
If state legislatures refuse to repeal laws mandating victim impact
evidence, they at least should narrow the scope of current laws in order
to bar victim impact evidence at capital sentencing hearings. Even if
the democratic branches of government accede to the demands of the
victims' rights movement, to the detriment of the defendant's constitu-
tional rights, the courts must act as a countermajoritarian influence and
apply rational legal thought to the debate surrounding victim impact
evidence. State courts should follow the lead of the New Jersey Su-
preme Court, and, notwithstanding Payne, find that their state's consti-
tution bars victim impact evidence from capital sentencing proceedings.
At the very least, the Supreme Court should clarify its holding in
Payne and instruct courts that the admission of victim opinion evi-
dence in sentence determination is unconstitutional per se, inadmissi-
ble, and reversible error. The Court should interpret narrowly its
decision in Payne and allow the admission of victim impact evidence
only in the least inflammatory manner, through the reading of the vic-
tim impact statement by the prosecutor rather than through live testi-
mony. The Court should bar the admission of evidence of the
defendant's bad character merely as a retort to evidence of his good
character. Also, the Court should ban the introduction of evidence of
the victim's good character used to counteract the evidence of the de-
fendant's good character, because allowing such evidence forces the jury
to consider and balance irrelevant, misleading, and confusing evidence.
This Note does not argue that victims should be relegated to a po-
sition outside the criminal justice system. Rather, this Note argues that
the victim's role within the system should not encroach upon the con-
stitutional rights of the defendant. States should provide greater re-
sources to assist victims so as to alleviate the psychological need to
present victim impact evidence. Victim impact evidence does not fur-
ther the goals of sentencing; it injects arbitrary and inflammatory evi-
dence into the sentencing decision, and it leads to disparate treatment
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of similarly situated defendants. The courts and legislatures should
take steps toward diminishing the harm caused by victim impact evi-
dence and eventually should eliminate its use.
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